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SPECIAL PURPOSE MUNICIPAL ENTITIES AND 
BANKRUPTCY: THE CASE OF PUBLIC COLLEGES 
Matthew A. Bruckner* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article builds on the municipal bankruptcy literature by showing why 
the common analogy between corporate shareholders and city residents does 
not hold in the case of certain special purpose municipal entities. For example, 
some scholars argue that “local residents” are best situated to avoid municipal 
financial distress by preventing it ex ante through the political process or 
remedying it ex post by repaying creditors through increased taxes. But 
residents’ ability to avoid financial distress is limited when a special purpose 
municipal entity spans political boundaries or tax jurisdictions because it is not 
clear who counts as a “local resident” in such cases. These boundary-spanning 
entities include certain hospitals and institutions of higher education. Instead of 
residents, this Article concludes that either creditors or the state are better 
situated to address the financial distress of boundary-spanning special purpose 
municipal entities, such as public institutions of higher education. 
This Article also reviews every decision where eligibility for relief under 
chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code was contested and distills a set of definitions 
for “municipality” that can be used to determine whether an entity must seek 
relief under chapter 9 (or if chapter 11 is available). Then, this Article applies 
those definitions to public institutions of higher education and determines that 
they, unlike private institutions, are eligible for relief only under chapter 9 of 
the Bankruptcy Code. This is the same set of provisions under which Detroit, 
Michigan and Stockton, California sought relief. But because many states 
restrict access to chapter 9 entirely, access to the bankruptcy courts may be 
completely unavailable for public institutions of higher education in those states.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Financial distress continues to plague institutions of higher education 
(IHEs), including public IHEs.1 For example, in 2019 Alaska threatened to slash 
its higher education budget by $135 million, equivalent to a “41 percent 
reduction in state funding.”2 The severity of these cuts prompted an “unusual” 
letter from the University of Alaska’s accrediting body, the Northwest 
Commission on Colleges and Universities, to the Alaska Legislature warning 
that the cuts could “potentially jeopardize the accreditation status of these 
institutions.”3 Also arguing against the cuts, University of Alaska president 
Jim Johnsen claimed that the size of these reductions would force the system to:  
abruptly halt[] numerous student career pathways midstream, 
eliminat[e] services or shut[] down community campuses or 
universities[,] . . . discontinu[e] . . . programs and services with little 
or no notice, and that in turn will have ripple effects, damaging UA’s 
ability to generate revenue and causing even greater harm across the 
state.4  
In response to these cuts, the University of Alaska system declared a “so-
called financial exigency,” which would allow employees, including tenured 
professors, to be quickly fired and programs, or even entire campuses, to be 
closed.5 Financial exigency has been called the “the academic equivalent of 
bankruptcy reorganization . . . .”6 But why not use the regular bankruptcy 
system? After all, debtors in a bankruptcy proceeding gain access to a set of tools 
for resolving that entity’s financial distress.7 
 
 1 Many land grant colleges and universities have become public IHEs in the way we think about these 
categories today. As such, the analysis contained herein applies to them as it does to other public IHEs. To the 
extent that a land grant college or university is now a private institution, the analysis contained herein does not 
apply to them. See Perry Dane et al., Saving Rutgers-Camden, 44 RUTGERS L.J. 337, 398 (2014) (arguing that 
“the concepts of ‘public’ and ‘private’ are deeply, and rightly, consequential, the meaning of those concepts, and 
not only their specific applications, turn out to be contingent, contested, and richly complex.”). 
 2 Colleen Flaherty, Accreditation Risk from Alaska Cuts, INSIDE HIGHER ED (July 10, 2019), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/07/10/u-alaskas-accreditor-warns-funding-cuts-could-threaten-
systems-status. Ultimately, the university’s budget was cut by $70 million over three years, instead of an 
immediate, $135 million cut. See Doug Lederman, Budget Compromise in Alaska, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Aug. 14, 
2019), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/08/14/alaskas-governor-and-university-reach-compromise-
nearly-halve-budget-cut. 
 3 Flaherty, supra note 2; see Lederman, supra note 2. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Yereth Rosen, University of Alaska Regents Postpone ‘Financial-exigency’ Decision, REUTERS 
(July 15, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-alaska-politics-idUSKCN1UB05E. 
 6 Id. 
 7 See infra notes 38–49 and accompanying text (discussing the bankruptcy toolkit).  
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As discussed in several earlier articles, bankruptcy reorganization is 
functionally unavailable to nearly all IHEs because the Higher Education Act 
(HEA) makes entering bankruptcy “an effective death sentence” for most IHEs.8 
I’ve argued that this should be changed.9 But even if the HEA were to be 
amended, bankruptcy reorganization would remain unavailable for many public 
IHEs because of state restrictions on bankruptcy access. 
This Article highlights that public IHEs are, in many states, doubly barred 
from bankruptcy reorganization—one legal bar and one economic. By analyzing 
the existing case law on access to chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code, this Article 
concludes that public IHEs are likely to be classified as municipalities for 
bankruptcy purposes, meaning they are barred from using chapter 11. Instead of 
using chapter 11, they may use chapter 9, if they have access at all. Access to 
chapter 9 is severely restricted, with “[o]nly twelve states specifically 
authoriz[ing] chapter 9 filings. Fifteen state[s] offer some limited form of 
chapter 9 filings for municipalities. The remaining 23 states do not authorize 
chapter 9 filings for municipalities.”10 In other words, in approximately half the 
states, public IHEs have no access to bankruptcy reorganization in any form.11 
Finally, this Article engages with the literatures on municipal financial 
distress and the governance of financially distressed entities to consider their 
application to public IHEs. Municipal bankruptcy law must balance the interests 
 
 8 Matthew Adam Bruckner, Bankrupting Higher Education, 91 AM. BANKR. L.J. 697, 698 (2017) 
[hereinafter, Bruckner, Bankrupting] (discussing the tools available to colleges in a bankruptcy reorganization, 
how colleges would benefit from the use of those tools, and arguing for lifting the bankruptcy ban for IHEs); see 
Matthew Adam Bruckner, Higher Ed “Do Not Resuscitate” Orders, 106 KY. L.J. 223, 228 (2018) [hereinafter, 
Bruckner, DNRs] (“Essentially, Congress has imposed an involuntary ‘do not resuscitate’ order on IHEs, 
condemning some socially valuable enterprises to an unnecessary death.”). But see Morris Brown: How an 
Atlanta HBCU Fell into Bankruptcy, THE ATLANTA J.-CONSTITUTION (Jan. 31, 2018), https://www.ajc.com/ 
news/local/morris-brown-college-timeline/I8aag6h6giHpHW84ExIAfM/ (discussing Morris Brown’s 
emergence from chapter 11 as an operating entity, albeit without access to Title IV funds). And while bankruptcy 
reorganization is unavailable for most IHEs, IHEs can liquidate in bankruptcy. See, e.g., Mark Reilly, McNally 
Smith College Files for Bankruptcy, MINNEAPOLIS / ST. PAUL BUS. J. (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.bizjournals. 
com/twincities/news/2018/02/09/mcnally-smith-college-files-for-bankruptcy.html. 
 9 See Bruckner, Bankrupting, supra note 8, at 698–99; see also Bruckner, DNRs, supra note 8, at 229. 
Others have made similar claims as well. See Scott F. Norberg, Bankruptcy and Higher Education Institutions, 
23 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 385, 392 (2015); see also Michael B. Goldstein & Jay Indyke, Bankruptcy Benefits, 
TRUSTEESHIP MAGAZINE, (Sept./Oct. 2016), www.agb.org/trusteeship/2016/septemberoctober/bankruptcy-
benefits. 
 10 D. Nicholas Panzarella, Determining the Meaning of “Instrumentality” in the Bankruptcy Code, 7 ST. 
JOHN’S BANKR. RESEARCH LIBR. No. 17, at *12 (2015) (citing Kenneth E. Noble & Kevin M. Baum, Municipal 
Bankruptcies: An Overview and Recent History of Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code, 9 PRATT’S J. BANKR. L. 
513 (2013)). 
 11 Legislatures could, of course, authorize a distressed public IHE to reorganize either through a one-off 
authorization or a more broadly-applicable statutory amendment.  
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of a state’s residents, local (the municipality’s) residents, and their creditors. 
This Article analyzes whether “residents,” creditors, or state financial boards are 
best situated to prevent or remedy the financial distress of public IHEs. In doing 
so, this Article builds on the municipal bankruptcy literature by showing why 
the common analogy between corporate shareholders and city residents does not 
hold in the case of certain special purpose municipal entities.  
For example, some scholars argue that “local residents” are best situated to 
avoid municipal financial distress by preventing it ex ante through the political 
process or remedying it ex post by repaying creditors through increased taxes or 
selling municipal assets. But residents’ ability to prevent or remedy financial 
distress is limited when a special purpose municipal entity spans political 
boundaries and tax jurisdictions. These boundary-spanning entities include 
certain hospitals and institutions of higher education. In addition, it is not clear 
who counts as a “local resident” in such cases. This Article concludes that 
neither creditors12 nor the state are necessarily better situated to prevent or 
remedy the financial distress of boundary-spanning special purpose municipal 
entities, such as public institutions of higher education. But local “residents” 
should clearly not bear that burden.  
In conclusion, this Article argues that because public IHEs cannot currently 
reorganize in bankruptcy and because states have not created higher education 
financial control boards, many public IHEs suffer unnecessarily, harming 
students, residents, faculty, staff, and others. States need to reorganize their 
higher education systems and choose a path forward for their public IHEs. 
  
 
 12 Forcing creditors to bear the brunt of a public IHE’s financial distress would be best accomplished 
through bankruptcy reorganization, but this assumes that access to Title IV would remain available, which it 
currently does not for reasons addressed in earlier work. See supra note 9.  
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I. MANY PUBLIC IHES ARE FINANCIALLY DISTRESSED 
Even before the losses IHEs are anticipating because of the novel 
coronavirus, SARS-CoV-2, many public IHEs were in financial trouble.13 On an 
inflation-adjusted basis, funding for public IHEs is down substantially since the 
2008 recession, with twenty states cutting per student support “by more than 20 
percent,” and nine states cutting more than 30 percent.14 And the cuts continue. 
Alaska just cut approximately twenty percent of its planned allocation to the 
University of Alaska system (after threatening a forty percent reduction).15 The 
threatened cuts were expected to result in “massive” layoffs, and a drop “in 
student enrollment because of program eliminations and reputational damage to 
the institutions.”16 But even the smaller reduction would result in restrictions, 
administrative consolidation, and restructuring.17 
In Wisconsin, state funding dropped by “$362 million from fiscal 2012 to 
2017,” forcing “campuses to lay off employees, freeze vacant positions, 
consolidate administrative functions, cut back on academic advising and offer 
fewer course sections.”18 Similarly, the University of Puerto Rico expects to 
receive less than half the appropriation it has historically received from the 
Puerto Rican government.19 
 
 13 Michael Mitchell et al., Unkept Promises: State Cuts to Higher Education Threaten Access and Equity, 
CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.cbpp.org/research/state-budget-and-
tax/unkept-promises-state-cuts-to-higher-education-threaten-access-and (“Overall state funding for public two- 
and four-year colleges in the school year ending in 2018 was more than $7 billion below its 2008 level, after 
adjusting for inflation.”); cf. Bruckner, Bankrupting, supra note 8, at 700–05 (discussing the financial headwinds 
faced by many IHEs); Bruckner, DNRs, supra note 8, at 231–38; Matthew Adam Bruckner, Terminating Tenure: 
Rejecting Tenure Contracts in Bankruptcy, 92 AM. BANKR. L.J. 255, 258–61 (2018) [hereinafter, Bruckner, 
Terminating Tenure]. 
 14 Mitchell et al, supra note 13, at 3.  
 15 Nick Hazelrigg, ‘Shocking’ Cut May Force Layoffs for Alaska’s Universities, INSIDE HIGHER ED 
(July 1, 2019), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/07/01/imminent-massive-cuts-could-force-faculty-
staff-layoffs-university-alaska-system. 
 16 Id. 
 17 See Doug Lederman, Budget Compromise in Alaska, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Aug. 14, 2019), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/08/14/alaskas-governor-and-university-reach-compromise-nearly-
halve-budget-cut. 
 18 Karen Herzog & Jason Stein, Walker Proposes Tuition Cut, UW Funding Boost, MILWAUKEE J. 
SENTINEL (Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/politics/2017/02/07/gov-scott-walker-announce-
details-his-university-wisconsin-tuition-cut-tuesday/97586678/. 
 19 By 2022, its appropriation is expected to drop “under $400 million, 56 percent lower than 
the $879 million baseline figure at which the Puerto Rican government historically funded the university’s 
operations.” Elizabeth Redden, Deep Cuts in Puerto Rico, INSIDE HIGHER ED (July 11, 2019), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/07/11/university-puerto-rico-faces-deep-cuts-appropriations#.XS4 
g74xpmk8.twitter (citing “estimates that the university has lost about 40 percent of its professors from attrition 
over the past decade” while tuition has nearly tripled on a per credit basis). 
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It is not clear that public IHEs will have to endure the “transformative re-
alignment” that some commentators have long predicted for the entire higher 
education sector—though the current pandemic will surely have long-lasting 
effects.20 But it is also undeniable that some IHEs that are currently struggling 
will merge or close.21 Scores of IHEs close every year,22 including more than 
two dozen public IHEs in the last few years.23  
Most IHEs that close are small, for-profit trade schools, such as cosmetology 
schools.24 But “a significant number” of small independent colleges have 
shuttered their doors, most of which suffered from a mix of questionable 
management, enrollment declines, and adverse economic headwinds.25 Closer 
 
 20 See, e.g., Stuart M. Butler, The Coming Higher-Ed Revolution, NAT’L AFFAIRS (Winter 2012), 
http://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/the-coming-higher-ed-revolution (describing the higher 
education industry as being on the “verge of . . . a transformative re-alignment”); Doug Lederman, The Culling 
of Higher Ed Begins, INSIDE HIGHER ED (July 19, 2017), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/07/19/ 
number-colleges-and-universities-drops-sharply-amid-economic-turmoil [hereinafter, Lederman, Culling] 
(noting that “[i]t has become trendy to predict that higher education is on the verge of a major collapse . . . .”). 
 21 “Georgia, which has lapped all other states with a five-round consolidation tear that has combined 14 
institutions into seven since 2011 and currently has leaders attempting to fold four more into two institutions.” 
Rick Seltzer, Are Mergers in Pennsylvania Higher Ed’s Future?, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Mar. 27, 2017), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/03/27/mergers-havent-been-part-pennsylvania-public-higher-eds-
past-might-future-be. 
 22 Almost 100 (predominantly private) IHEs closed for good in 2015–16. See U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, Education Should Address Oversight and Communication Gaps in Its Monitoring of 
the Financial Condition of Schools (Aug. 2017), https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/686709.pdf; see also 
Richard Fossey, 763 Colleges and Schools Closed Last Year, and Most of Their Former Students Have Student 
Loan Debt, CONDEMNED TO DEBT: THE $TUDENT LOAN CRISIS (Mar. 10, 2017), http://www.condemnedtodebt. 
org/2017/03/763-colleges-and-schools-closed-last.html (more than 13,000 federal-aid-receiving, post-
secondary schools (or branch campuses) have closed since 1984); Goldstein & Indyke, supra note 9 (noting that 
160 independent colleges have closed since 2000); Lederman, Culling, supra note 20; Kate Smith, Here’s What 
Happens to Endowments When Colleges Close, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
articles/2017-03-06/orphan-endowments-of-dead-schools-bedevil-states-across-america (citing figures from the 
Education Department to conclude that hundreds of college campuses close each year, including 763 campuses 
in 2016). 
 23 Lederman, Culling, supra note 20 (“The number of public colleges edged down to 1,985 in 2016–17, 
from 1,990 in 2015–16 and 2,009 in 2012–13.”). 
 24 Fossey, supra note 22 (describing most closed schools as “small propriety trade schools, barber 
schools, schools of cosmetology, etc, which had relatively small numbers of students.”). 
 25 Id.; see also Doug Lederman, Another Small Private Closes Its Doors: Dowling College, INSIDE 
HIGHER ED (June 1, 2016), https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2016/06/01/another-small-private-
closes-its-doors-dowling-college. However, some closures have been large, publicly-traded educational 
enterprises. See, e.g., Bruckner, Bankrupting, supra note 8, at 704 (discussing the collapse of Corinthian and 
Anthem colleges). 
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to home for many readers may be the news that, since 2017, six law schools have 
closed or announced they will close.26 Other law schools have merged.27  
But most relevant to this Article, public IHEs are also struggling.28 In the 
last few years, twenty-five public IHEs closed.29 And more might follow, 
including some public IHEs in Pennsylvania.30 Pennsylvania has kept some of 
its IHEs afloat through a series of loans, but legislators’ willingness to continue 
doing so and the universities’ ability to credibly commit to repay those loans 
appears to be wearing out.31 The Pennsylvania higher education system has 
weakened financially because of adverse demographic trends, falling 
 
 26  These schools are Arizona Summit Law School, Charlotte School of Law, Indiana Tech Law School, 
Savannah Law School, Valparaiso University Law School, and Whittier Law School. See Welcome to Arizona 
Summit Law School, ARIZ. SUMMIT LAW SCH., https://azsummitlaw.edu/index.php (last accessed Apr. 2, 2019); 
Elizabeth Olson, For-Profit Charlotte School of Law Closes, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes. 
com/2017/08/15/business/dealbook/for-profit-charlotte-school-of-law-closes.html?_r=0; Marilyn Odendahl, 
Indiana Tech’s Closing of Law School Leaves Unanswered Questions, IND. LAWYER (May 31, 2017), 
https://www.theindianalawyer.com/articles/43828-indiana-techs-closing-of-law-school-leaves-unanswered-
questions; Debra Cassens Weiss, Savannah Law School Will Close, Students and Faculty Are Told, AM. BAR 
ASS’N J. (Mar. 22, 2018), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/savannah_law_school_will_close_ 
students_and_faculty_are_told; Emma Whitford, Another Law School Will Close, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Oct. 31, 
2018), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/10/31/valparaiso-law-school-will-close-following-unsuccessful-
attempt-transfer-middle; Sonali Kohli, et al., Whittier Law School Is Closing, Due in Part to Low Student 
Achievement, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/local/education/la-me-edu-whittier-law-
school-closing-20170420-story.html. Western State College of Law at Argosy University was expected to close 
after its parent shut down, but appears to have struck a deal to remain open for now. See Matthew Adam 
Bruckner, The Forgotten Stewards of Higher Education Quality, 11 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2020) 
(unpublished manuscript on file with author) (discussing Argosy University’s sudden closure). 
 27 Hamline and William Mitchell merged their law schools, Cooley closed one of its campuses, and 
several law schools administratively merged. See Adam Wahlberg, Why William Mitchell and Hamline Law Had 
to Merge, MINN. POST (Feb. 18, 2015), https://www.minnpost.com/education/2015/02/why-william-mitchell-
and-hamline-law-had-merge/ (discussing the Hamline-William Mitchell merger); Nathan Bomey, Cooley Law 
School Closing Ann Arbor Campus, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.freep.com/story/money/ 
business/michigan/2014/10/09/cooley-law-school-closing-ann-arbor-campus/16960617/ (discussing Cooley 
“closing its Ann Arbor campus amid a nationwide downturn in law school enrollments”); American Bar 
Association Approves Merger Creating Rutgers Law School, RUTGERS NEWS (July 31, 2015), 
https://news.rutgers.edu/news-release/american-bar-association-approves-merger-creating-rutgers-law-school/ 
20150727#.WhJDGktrzBI (noting the merger of Rutgers-Camden and Rutgers-Newark); Dawn Rhodes, UIC 
Approves Merger with John Marshall Law School, CHI. TRIB. (July 19, 2018), http://www.chicagotribune.com/ 
news/ct-met-john-marshall-law-school-uic-20180719-story.html (focusing on the merger between John 
Marshall Law School and the University of Illinois at Chicago, creating Chicago’s first public law school). 
 28 Lederman, Culling, supra note 20 (“While for-profit colleges’ woes may be driving the numbers, public 
and private nonprofit colleges have not been immune.”). 
 29 Id.  
 30 See Marc Levy, Some PA State Colleges in Danger of Closing, THE MORNING CALL (Feb. 27, 2017, 
12:08 PM), http://www.mcall.com/news/breaking/mc-pa-state-colleges-in-danger-20170225-story.html#. 
 31 See Rick Seltzer, Are Mergers in Pennsylvania Higher Ed’s Future?, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Mar. 27, 
2017), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/03/27/mergers-havent-been-part-pennsylvania-public-higher-eds-
past-might-future-be. 
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enrollment, and decreased state funding.32 As a result, some expect the state to 
recommend “that some of the schools shut their doors.”33  
Many other state higher education systems are facing issues similar to 
Pennsylvania’s.34 And some, such as Georgia, have responded by aggressively 
reducing the number of its public IHEs.35 Among states with struggling public 
higher education systems, Georgia has shown itself to be particularly willing to 
consolidate its public IHEs, with multiple rounds of forced mergers occurring 
since 2011.36 
II. THE BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATION TOOLKIT 
“Going bankrupt” is an expression with negative connotations for many 
people.37 But bankruptcy lawyers know that bankruptcy reorganization allows 
struggling enterprises to access a set of tools for addressing financial distress 
that are generally not available outside of bankruptcy. As a result, bankruptcy 
lawyers often encourage their financially distressed clients to seek bankruptcy 
 
 32 Id. (“as enrollment dropped, state funding slowed and Rust Belt demographic trends increased 
downward pressure on the system’s potential for a long-term recovery.”); see also Kellie Woodhouse, Mergers 
on the Rise?, INSIDE HIGHER ED (July 7, 2015), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/07/07/colleges-
struggle-some-look-partnerships-and-mergers-relief (“Per-student funding at public colleges has seen near 
across-the-board decreases in the U.S.”); Levy, supra note 30 (“Pennsylvania’s university system is suffering 
from dropping in-state high school graduations, a result of fewer school-age youth, and similarly deep cuts in 
state aid over the past eight years. The system is also at a disadvantage with many campuses in relatively rural 
areas trying to compete with urban powerhouses such as Temple University or the University of Pittsburgh, or 
Penn State and its satellite campuses.”). 
 33 Levy, supra note 30. 
 34 See, e.g., Scott Waldman, Consolidation Cuts 3 SUNY President Jobs, TIMESUNION (Aug. 18, 2011), 
https://www.timesunion.com/local/article/Consolidation-cuts-3-SUNY-president-jobs-2079006.php (reporting 
on financial issues in the New York State public college system that resulted in administrative consolidation).  
 35 Ry Rivard, Going Wild on Mergers, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Jan. 7, 2015), https://www.insidehighered. 
com/news/2015/01/07/georgia-officials-hope-georgia-state-u-can-improve-local-two-year-college-taking-it 
(“With this change, he’ll have reduced the number of colleges in the system to 29 from 35 when he took office 
in 2011. The system’s Board of Regents also on Tuesday finalized the merger of Kennesaw State University and 
Southern Polytechnic State University.”); Levy, supra note 30 (“In Georgia, the state university system is 
pursuing a five-year plan to merge eight public colleges into four following cuts in state aid.”); Woodhouse, 
supra note 32 (discussing the merger of public IHE, Salem State). 
 36 “Georgia, which has lapped all other states with a five-round consolidation tear that has combined 14 
institutions into seven since 2011 and currently has leaders attempting to fold four more into two institutions.” 
Seltzer, supra note 31. In 2018, the University of Wisconsin received approval from its accreditor “to merge its 
13 two-year campuses with seven of its four-year colleges . . . .” Kelly Meyerhofer, UW System Merger 
Approved. Here’s When the Official Transfer Takes Place, WISCONSIN STATE J. (June 30, 2018), 
https://madison.com/wsj/news/local/education/university/uw-system-merger-approved-here-s-when-the-official-
transfer/article_aa4d164b-4983-5306-ab53-b1e766bd465c.html. 
 37 See, e.g., Michael D. Sousa, Bankruptcy Stigma: A Socio-Legal Study, 87 AM. BANKR. L.J. 435, 464 
(2013) (reporting that “feelings of shame and embarrassment can persist for years after the bankruptcy filing.”). 
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protection sooner rather than later. And the bankruptcy toolkit may be useful for 
some public IHEs.38  
The bankruptcy toolkit includes: (i) deleveraging an entity’s balance sheet 
through the discharge available at the confirmation of a bankruptcy case;39 and 
(ii) the ability to renegotiate, assume, assign, or reject certain pre-bankruptcy 
contracts, including unexpired leases and collective bargaining agreements.40 
Bankruptcy courts also have a convening power that encourages creditors to 
renegotiate various obligations.41  
The ability to renegotiate contractual obligations is critical for public IHEs 
that are “likely to need to restructure their operations and finances in response 
to changes in student demand.”42 For example, public IHEs have employment 
contracts with athletic coaches and vendors that they may want to terminate if 
they eliminate a particular sport program.43 They may also want to reduce 
 
 38 For most IHEs, the bankruptcy toolkit includes the automatic stay, which can give an entity that is 
trying to turn itself around “the breathing room needed to focus on restructuring their obligations instead of 
lurching from crisis to crisis.” Bruckner, DNRs, supra note 8, at 245; see also 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2019). But while 
the ability to seize the debtor’s property is “[t]he most basic remedy available to creditors in the private sphere,” 
courts have long restricted creditor’s ability to seize the property of a public debtor. See Randal C. Picker & 
Michael W. McConnell, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 425, 429–30 (1993) (citing City of Chicago v. Hasley, 25 Ill. 485, 487 (1861) (holding “that a fi. fa. 
cannot issue against the city of Chicago.”)); see also Juliet M. Moringiello, Municipal Capital Structure and 
Chapter 9 Creditor Priorities, BROOKINGS INST. (2016), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/ 
10/moringiello1.pdf (“Public debtors are unique in that their assets are not available to creditors, thus limiting 
creditor remedies against municipalities.”); Farmerville v. Commercial Credit Co., 136 So. 82, 84 (1931) 
(holding that machinery incorporated into a public waterworks was unavailable to be levied upon, despite the 
town having voluntarily granted a lien on the machinery). 
 39 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 901(a), 943(b), and 944(b) (2019); cf. 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (2019). Public IHEs may be 
better able to take advantage of this tool than many debtors because they are less likely to have secured debt. 
Public IHEs cannot issue blanket liens on all assets as many private companies claim to do. See generally Melissa 
B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Tracing Equity: Realizing and Allocating Value in Chapter 11, 96 TEX. L. REV. 
673 (2018) (contesting the claim that either Article 9 of the UCC or the Bankruptcy Code allows a company to 
issue a blanket lien covering a firm’s going concern value). 
 40 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 365, 1113, 1114 (2019); see also In re City of Vallejo, 403 B.R. 72, 78 (2009) 
(“[S]ection 1113 is not applicable in chapter 9 cases, and a chapter 9 debtor is not required to comply with it in 
order to reject an executory collective bargaining agreement.”); see generally Bruckner, Terminating Tenure, 
supra note 13 (focusing on the treatment of tenure contracts by bankrupt IHEs). 
 41 See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin, Bankrupt Politics and the Politics of Bankruptcy, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1399, 
1447 (2012) (“As a convening tool, bankruptcy brings all claimants together into a single proceeding and settles 
(nearly) all claims.”). 
 42 Bruckner, DNRs, supra note 8, at 247. 
 43 See, e.g., Blair Kerkhoff, As Missouri Higher Education Budget Is Slashed, Sports Programs Also Face 
Cuts, KAN. CITY STAR (July 7, 2017), https://www.kansascity.com/sports/college/article160193359.html 
(discussing the cost savings from, among other things staff reductions, that accompanies eliminating various 
sport teams, such as field hockey at Missouri State, the dance team at Missouri Southern, and cheerleading at 
UMKC). 
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headcount in other areas as well, such as dismissing tenured faculty or unionized 
adjuncts, particularly in departments that no longer attract many students.44 
While some of these contracts are likely to have financial exigency clauses that 
allow termination outside of bankruptcy, not all do and many financial exigency 
clauses require that certain procedural steps be taken before they can be 
exercised.45 Thus, this bankruptcy tool remains valuable for public IHEs.  
Public IHEs may restructure their contractual obligations outside of 
bankruptcy. But they are liable to their counterparties for the full amounts due 
under those contracts if they breach their obligations outside of bankruptcy. By 
contrast, the Bankruptcy Code puts debtors in a very strong negotiating position 
vis-à-vis their contractual counterparties by allowing debtors to terminate their 
contracts and pay their counterparties as unsecured creditors, meaning that 
counterparties often receive a very small payout. The threat of reduced payouts 
can create a strong incentive for counterparties to restrike their bargain and to 
offer debtors more favorable terms. This power is even more pronounced in 
municipal bankruptcy cases, which removes certain limits on terminating 
collective bargaining agreements, which are present in other types of bankruptcy 
cases.46 
Another important tool in the bankruptcy toolkit is the ability to discharge 
some forms of overindebtedness. Southern Vermont College blamed, in part, 
excessive debt as the reason for the school’s financial difficulties and ultimate 
closure.47 An IHE may grow overindebted for various reasons, including 
because it expanded too quickly48 or because of “lax oversight and startling 
 
 44 See Gregory M. Saltzman, Dismissals, Layoffs, and Tenure Denials in Colleges and Universities, in 
Harold S. Wechsler (ed.), NEA 2008 ALMANAC OF HIGHER EDUCATION 1, 52 (2008), https://www.nea.org/assets/ 
img/PubAlmanac/ALM_08_05.pdf (“Layoffs at a college or university may result from reduced state 
appropriations for public higher education, enrollment declines that lower the need for personnel, or a decision 
to close an academic program to free up funding for others.”); see generally Bruckner, Terminating Tenure, 
supra note 13. 
 45 See Bruckner, Terminating Tenure, supra note 13, at 284–85.  
 46 See Picker & McConnell, supra note 38, at 467 (“Unlike private debtors, therefore, municipal debtors 
might be able to unilaterally abrogate collective bargaining agreements, subject only to liability for damages for 
breach of contract.”). 
 47 See Lola Duffort, Southern Vermont College Says It Will Close This Summer, VT. DIGGER (Mar. 4, 
2019), https://vtdigger.org/2019/03/04/southern-vermont-college-says-will-close-summer/ (noting that Southern 
Vermont College’s “heavy debt service was a factor in the school’s financial difficulties” and ultimate closure). 
 48 See Bruckner, Bankrupting, supra note 8, at 702 (discussing the rapid expansion of Corinthian Colleges 
and suggesting that this may have contributed to its demise); see also Alex Keefe, et al., A Look at Jane Sanders’ 
Role in the Closure of Burlington College, VPR (May 18, 2016), http://digital.vpr.net/ post/look-jane-sanders-
role-closure-burlington-college (discussing Burlington College’s failed plan to repay debt related to a substantial 
expansion of its physical plant, which ultimately contributing to the college’s closure).  
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mismanagement . . . .”49 By improving operations, and focusing on the IHE’s 
distinctive attributes, a formerly distressed IHE may be able to balance its budget 
and return to good financial health.  
An example of a distressed IHE that could likely benefit from the 
bankrupcy toolkit is Cheyney University of Pennsylvania. Cheyney, a 
historically black college that is part of the Pennsylvania State System of Higher 
Education, has endured a raft of financial issues recently.50 Cheyney’s problems 
arise from a variety of sources, but mismanagement seems to be one of the most 
important. For example, Cheyney’s enrollment declined precipitously from 
about 1,500 students in 2007 to fewer than 500 enrollees in 2018 in part because 
the university “failed to open or process the applications of as many as 3,000 
prospective students between 2012 and 2015.”51 The university also failed to 
collect tuition from students that it did enroll, with as much as “$7 million in 
outstanding tuition bills” at one point.52 Even more troubling, Cheyney may have 
violated state and federal law, including U.S. Department of Education regulations 
related to its handling of federal grant, loan, and work-study funds.53 These failures 
have imperiled Cheyney’s financial health, requiring repeated cash infusions from 
the Pennsylvania,54 placed Cheyney’s accreditation in serious risk,55 and resulted 
in Cheyney being placed on Heightened Cash Management 2 status by the 
Education Department.56 
 
 49 Nancy Phillips, et al., Can Cheyney University Survive?, PHILA. INQUIRER (Nov. 15, 2017) https:// 
www.inquirer.com/education/inq/cheyney-university-pennsylvania-hbcu-admissions-graduation-rate-failure-
investigation-20171115.html (“Those dismal statistics come after more than a decade of unstable and at times 
questionable leadership, leaving the school with soaring debt as well as shrinking enrollment. But in the last several 
years, Cheyney’s top administrators, along with its trustees and the state system’s board of governors, have deepened 
the crisis through lax oversight and startling mismanagement . . . .”). 
 50 Id. 
 51 See id. (listing Cheyney’s various issues, including enrollment issues); see also Ryanne Persinger, 
Cheyney University’s President: ‘There Will Be a Cheyney in the Future,’ PHILA. TRIB. (Mar. 4, 2019), 
https://www.phillytrib.com/news/local_news/cheyney-university-s-president-there-will-be-a-cheyney-in/ 
article_a41725c0-15f0-50f3-b972-30209f1cd38c.html (“Cheyney had the steepest fall in enrollment among the 
14 state-run colleges, according to data from the PASSHE. The number of students had plummeted by nearly 38 
percent, going from 755 students being enrolled in the spring of 2018 to only 469 enrollees that fall.”). 
 52 Phillips, et al., supra note 49. 
 53 Id. (describing possible violations including that “Cheyney administrators raided scholarship funds and 
research grants meant for students and faculty as well as other restricted funds totaling $3.4 million. They spent the 
money on day-to-day expenses, in possible violation of state and federal law.” And a Justice Department investigation 
found “serious lapses in Cheyney’s handling of $29 million in federal grants, loans, and work-study funds.”). 
 54 Persinger, supra note 51 (noting that Cheyney owes approximately $43 million to the state). 
 55 Id. (“‘[T]he issue is accreditation. If you don’t get accredited, you’re no longer eligible for Title IV 
funds, nor are you eligible for Pell Grants, etc., and we would default on one of the conditions of staying 
accredited,’ he said about federal grants, student loans[,] and other funding.”). 
 56 Dan Bauman, These Colleges’ Finances Are Now Being Watched More Closely by the Education Dept., 
CHRONICLE OF HIGHER ED. (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.chronicle.com/article/These-Colleges-Finances-
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Although Pennsylvania seemed willing to work with Cheyney to forgive a 
substantial portion of its debt,57 bankruptcy reorganization would allow an IHE 
to discharge some or all of its debt regardless of whether its creditors are willing 
to negotiate. While debt reduction alone is often not sufficient to return an IHE 
to financial health and ensure its continued viability, it is an important part of 
the equation. And schools like Cheyney, a historically black university serving 
historically disadvantaged students, is exactly the type of school that ought to be 
given a chance to recover from managerial missteps. Moreover, IHEs that are 
forced to close instead of reorganizing disrupt students’ academic careers, with 
some students likely dropping out instead of transferring to another college.  
* * * 
In previous articles, I’ve made the case for allowing IHEs access to 
bankruptcy reorganization and I won’t rehash those arguments here.58 But even 
assuming that the HEA amendments I’ve previously recommended are adopted, 
those would only lift the higher education “do not resuscitate” order for private 
colleges.59 Unless further steps are taken, bankruptcy reorganization is likely to 
remain unavailable for many public IHEs.60 In the next section, this Article 
analyzes the existing case law regarding which entities must use chapter 9. It 
concludes that, unlike private IHEs, public IHEs are likely required to file 
bankruptcy under chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code. Although the case law is 
very sparse, existing doctrine provides a roadmap for courts to use when 
analyzing the availability of bankruptcy relief for public IHEs. 
Assuming that courts agree with my analysis, many public IHEs will be 
forced to wind down entirely outside of bankruptcy because many states restrict 
access to chapter 9, and chapter 11 will be unavailable to public IHEs.61 This 
 
Are/244661. 
 57 See Susan Snyder, Cheyney University to Partner with Thomas Jefferson, Starbucks in a Comeback 
Bid, PHILA. INQUIRER (July 31, 2018), https://www.inquirer.com/philly/education/cheyney-university-
starbucks-partnership-institute-thomas-jefferson-starbucks-20180731.html (“The state system last year agreed 
to forgive $30 million in loans to Cheyney if it balances its budget in each of the next four years, with a warning 
that it would be the last financial lifeline.”); see also Susan Snyder, State Throws Cheyney University $30 Million 
Lifeline, PHILA. INQUIRER (Aug. 22, 2017), https://www.inquirer.com/philly/education/cheyney-university-
loan-state-forgives-30-million-20170822.html (“Pennsylvania’s state university system on Tuesday extended a 
lifeline to struggling Cheyney University, agreeing to forgive more than $30 million in loans if the school can achieve 
and maintain a balanced budget over the next four years.”). 
 58 See supra note 9. I note, however, that the case has only been strengthened because of the current 
pandemic. 
 59 Bruckner, DNRs, supra note 8. 
 60 See infra Section III.  
 61 In addition to chapter 9’s advantageous collective bargaining rules, public IHEs could prefer to 
reorganize under chapter 9 instead of chapter 11. For instance, chapter 9 debtors have the exclusive right to 
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stands in contrast to the options available to private IHEs, which may currently 
liquidate in chapter 7 and which would be allowed to reorganize under chapter 
11, if the HEA were amended according to my previous suggestions. 
III. PUBLIC IHES MAY NOT FILE CHAPTER 11 
Under the United States Bankruptcy Code, relief is available to almost every 
type of enterprise and individual person.62 However, the Bankruptcy Code is 
divided into several chapters and access to each chapter is generally limited to 
certain types of persons or entities. For example, railroads, banks, domestic 
insurance companies, and, most relevant to this Article, municipalities, are 
ineligible for relief under chapter 7.63 And although chapter 11 is generally 
available to most debtors, municipalities may not use chapter 11.64 Instead, 
chapter 9 is the only type of bankruptcy available to a “municipality,” which 
includes cities, counties, townships, school districts, public improvement 
districts, and certain revenue-producing entities.65 Although there is no authority 
directly on point, the term municipality likely includes public IHEs. 
Under the Bankruptcy Code, “municipality” is defined as a “political 
subdivision or public agency or instrumentality of a State.”66 While these terms 
are not further defined by the Bankruptcy Code, their meaning has been 
addressed directly in a few cases. The case law is sparse because parties do not 
often litigate over whether a particular entity is a municipality.67 Nevertheless, 
this Article will analyze the existing case law to consider whether public IHEs 
would be considered a municipality for chapter 9’s purposes. This issue has 
 
submit a plan of adjustment, whereas the debtor’s exclusive right to propose a plan of organization in chapter 11 
can be curtailed. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 941 (2019), with 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (2019).  
 62 See 11 U.S.C. § 109 (2019); cf. David A. Skeel, Jr., When Should Bankruptcy Be an Option (for People, 
Places or Things)?, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2217, 2225 (2014) (arguing that administrative resolution is 
sufficiently similar to federal bankruptcy protection that they should be treated as synonymous).  
 63 11 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)–(2). 
 64 11 U.S.C. § 109(d). 
 65 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(1); see, e.g., In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014); In re 
City of Stockton, 526 B.R. 35 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2015); In re Sullivan Cty. Reg’l Refuse Disposal Dist., 165 B.R. 
60 (Bankr. C.D.N.H. 1994) (revenue-producing waste disposal districts); In re N.Y.C. Off-Track Betting Corp., 
427 B.R. 256 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (revenue-producing horse-racing-betting parlors). Compare In re Cty. of 
Orange, 183 B.R. 594 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995) (holding public school district is a municipality), with In re City 
of Central Falls, 468 B.R. 36 (Bankr. D.R.I. 2012) (holding public school district is not a municipality). 
 66 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) (2019). 
 67 United States v. Hosp. Auth. of Charlton Cty. (In re Hosp. Auth. of Charlton Cty., No. 12-50305, 2012 
Bankr. LEXIS 3042 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. July 3, 2012), at *13–14 (“In reaching its decision, the court noted that 
‘statutory or caselaw guidance on what constitutes an instrumentality, or even a municipality, is scarce.’”) (citing 
In re Las Vegas Monorail, 429 B.R. 770, 775 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2010).  
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never been addressed by the courts.68 If public IHEs are a municipality, and if 
they satisfy chapter 9’s other eligibility requirements, they will be eligible for 
relief under chapter 9.69 But they will not be eligible for relief under chapters 7 
or 11. 
There are important differences between the relief available under chapter 9 
of the Bankruptcy Code relative to that available under chapters 7 and 11. For 
example, collective bargaining agreements are easier to abrogate under 
chapter 9.70 And this difference is highly salient in light of the importance of 
personnel costs to IHE budgets. Another important difference is that relief is 
presumptively available to qualified entities under chapters 7 and 11, but not 
under chapter 9.71 Because of constitutional issues related to state sovereignty, 
chapter 9 is only available to municipalities if “specifically authorized” under 
state law to reorganize in bankruptcy.72 And many states do not offer a blanket 
authorization for municipalities to file chapter 9.73 As a result, if public IHEs are 
limited to reorganizing under chapter 9, many will find that they lack access to 
bankruptcy altogether. 
 
 68 Given the paucity of case law analyzing municipal chapter choice issues, it is worth emphasizing the 
need to be cautious about any conclusions drawn from the analysis in this section.  
 69 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) provides that “[a]n entity may be a debtor under chapter 9 of this title if and only if 
such entity— (1) is a municipality; (2) is specifically authorized, in its capacity as a municipality or by name, to 
be a debtor under such chapter by State law, or by a governmental officer or organization empowered by State 
law to authorize such entity to be a debtor under such chapter; (3) is insolvent; (4) desires to effect a plan to 
adjust such debts; and (5) (A) has obtained the agreement of creditors holding at least a majority in amount of 
the claims of each class that such entity intends to impair under a plan in a case under such chapter; (B) has 
negotiated in good faith with creditors and has failed to obtain the agreement of creditors holding at least a 
majority in amount of the claims of each class that such entity intends to impair under a plan in a case under 
such chapter; (C) is unable to negotiate with creditors because such negotiation is impracticable; or (D) 
reasonably believes that a creditor may attempt to obtain a transfer that is avoidable under section 547 of this 
title.”  
 70 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (2019), which limits an entity’s ability to terminate collective bargaining agreements, 
is not applicable in a chapter 9 proceeding. 
 71 Panzarella, supra note 10, at *2 (“Chapter 11 debtors have relatively relaxed requirements as compared 
to chapter 9 debtors.”). 
 72 See 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2); see also Panzarella, supra note 10, at *2 (citing Kenneth E. Noble & Kevin 
M. Baum, Municipal Bankruptcies: An Overview and Recent History of Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code, 9 
PRATT’S J. BANKR. L. 513 (2013)). 
 73 See Vincent S.J. Buccola, Law and Legislation in Municipal Bankruptcy, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1301, 
1322–23 (discussing veto rights held by various gatekeepers to chapter 9) [hereinafter, Buccola, Legislation]; 
see also Laura Napoli Coordes, Gatekeepers Gone Wrong: Reforming the Chapter 9 Eligibility Rules, 94 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 1191, 1236–37 (2017). 
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A. The Political Subdivision Case Law 
A few cases have closely examined whether an entity is a political 
subdivision for purposes of chapter 9 eligibility.74 Usually, these cases involve 
an entity that sought protection under chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code and 
found its eligibility challenged on the grounds that it was not a political 
subdivision. Although there are other cases of political subdivisions accessing 
chapter 9 relief, those cases did not contest the question of whether the debtor 
was a political subdivision.75  
In this section I attempt to distill the key factors relied on by courts for 
determining whether an entity is a political subdivision. There appear to be three: 
(i) the label assigned to an entity by its creator; (ii) the statutes or regulations 
governing the formation of such entities; and (iii) the powers possessed by the 
entity in question. Each will be explored in more detail.  
Several of the relevant cases considering whether an entity was a political 
subdivision have focused their analysis primarily on the label ascribed to the 
bankrupt entity by statute.76 For example, in In re Sullivan County Regional 
Refuse Disposal District, the court determined that two garbage disposal 
facilities were political subdivisions because the entities were “statutorily 
defined as a body politic and corporate.”77 Similarly, in In re Boise County, the 
bankruptcy court concluded that Boise County, Idaho was a political subdivision 
for chapter 9’s purposes because Idaho state law describes counties as “a body 
 
 74 The issue has been raised in other instances, but in those cases, the courts did not provide a reasoned 
analysis as to why the relevant entity was a political subdivision. See, e.g., In re Sullivan Cty. Reg’l Refuse 
Disposal Dist., 165 B.R. 60 (Bankr. C.D.N.H. 1994); In re Boise Cty., 465 B.R. 156 (Bankr. C.D. Idaho 2011); 
In re Columbia Falls, Special Improv. Dist. No. 25, 143 B.R. 750 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1992); In re Cty. of Orange, 
183 B.R. 594 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995). 
 75 See, e.g., In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014); In re City of Stockton, 526 
B.R. 35 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2015). 
 76 See United States v. Hosp. Auth. of Charlton Cty. (In re Hosp. Auth. of Charlton Cty.), No. 12-50305, 
2012 Bankr. LEXIS 3042, at *9 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. July 3, 2012) (“The final factor considers the state’s own 
classification or description of the entity. When an entity is created as a ‘body corporate and politic,’ courts 
generally find that the entity is a governmental unit.”) (citing In re Westport Transit Dist., 165 B.R. 93, 95–96 
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1994)); see also In re Sullivan Cty. Reg’l Refuse Disposal Dist., 165 B.R. 60, 73 (Bankr. 
C.D.N.H. 1994); In re Pleasant View Util. Dist. of Cheatham Cty., 24 B.R. 632, 637 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1982); 
In re N.Y.C. Off-Track Betting Corp., 427 B.R. 256 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citing McKinney’s Racing, Pari-
Mutuel Wagering and Breeding Law § 603(1), which describes OTB as a “body corporate and politic.”). 
 77 In re Sullivan Cty. Reg’l Refuse Disposal Dist., 165 B.R. 60, 73 (Bankr. C.D.N.H. 1994). However, 
the court found that the waste disposal districts were ineligible for chapter 9 because they had failed to engage 
in good faith, pre-filing efforts to restructure their debts. See id. at 82 (“[T]he debtors still deliberately refrained 
from accessing their primary asset to attempt to resolve their financial problems.”). 
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politic and corporate.”78 This fact alone was sufficient for the court and no 
further discussion of the question occurred.79 
By contrast, other cases have focused on whether the entity in question 
“possess[ed] the characteristics of a sovereign”80 and whether they perform 
functions that are “essentially governmental in nature.”81 These cases find 
support for their approach in the IRS’s definition of “political subdivision,” 
which is “any division of any State or local government unit which is a municipal 
corporation or which has been delegated the right to exercise part of the 
sovereign power of the unit.”82 At a minimum, elements of sovereign power 
include: “the power to tax, the power of eminent domain or the police 
power.”83 In In re County of Orange, the court found that the bankrupt entity (an 
investment vehicle, not the county itself) had “neither sovereign power 
delegated to it by the State of California, nor . . . [did] it have by its existence 
some inherent sovereign power to act.”84 Instead, the bankrupt entity was merely 
“an investment vehicle formed by the County and administered by the Treasurer 
to receive, commingle, invest, hold, account for, and distribute funds of the 
participants who are authorized by state law to deposit their excess funds with 
the Treasurer.”85  
 
 78 In re Boise Cty., 465 B.R. at 167 (Bankr. C.D. Idaho 2011) (“Under Idaho law, the County is a body 
politic of the state of Idaho. See Idaho Code § 31-601”) (emphasis in original).  
 79 Although other courts sometimes discuss additional factors, a legislature’s decision to designate an 
entity as a body politic and corporate appears to be a salient fact in almost every case where a court has 
determined that an entity is a municipality. See, e.g., In re Westport Transit Dist., 165 B.R. 93, 95–96 (Bankr. 
D. Conn. 1994). This is true even when the court’s analysis suggests that other factors were considered. 
 80 In re Cty. of Orange, 183 B.R. 594, 602 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995); see also In re Sullivan Cty. Reg’l 
Refuse Disposal Dist., 165 B.R. 60; In re Hosp. Auth. of Charlton Cty., No. 12-50305, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 3042, 
at *7. 
 81 In re N.Y.C. City Off-Track Betting Corp., 427 B.R. 256, 261, 265 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (finding 
that New York City’s Off-Track Betting Corporation, which operated “a pari-mutuel betting system” with the 
dual purposes of raising revenue and “fighting the role of organized crime in horse-race gambling,” was a 
municipality). 
 82 26 C.F.R. § 1.103-1(b) (2011) (suggesting that political subdivisions may “include special assessment 
districts so created, such as road, water, sewer, gas, light, reclamation, drainage, irrigation, levee, school, harbor, 
port improvement, and similar districts and divisions of any such unit.”) (emphasis added). 
 83 In re Cty. of Orange, 183 B.R. at 602; see also Comm’r of Internal Revenue v. Shamberg’s Estate, 144 
F. 2d 998 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 792 (1945) (Although Shamberg only required that part or a 
portion of those powers be present to conclude that an entity created under state law for a governmental purpose 
is a political subdivision, subsequent authorities indicate that possession of only an insubstantial amount of any 
or all sovereign powers is not sufficient); Mark Norell et al., Comments on the Definition of Political Subdivision 
for Tax-Exempt Bonds and Other Tax-Advantaged Bonds, AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF TAXATION (2015), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/tax_lawyer/vol69/692/tax-comments-definiton-of-
political-subdivision-p313.pdf.  
 84 In re Cty. of Orange, 183 B.R. at 602. 
 85 Id. 
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Similarly, the Seven Counties court noted that the debtor was allowed to 
“seek a special ad valorem tax” if the board believed it lacked sufficient 
funding.86 However, the court concluded that Seven Counties lacked the 
traditional government power to tax because the entity could only request an 
assessment and could not levy the tax directly.87 This finding supported the 
court’s conclusion that the debtor was not a political subdivision.  
But, the power to tax is not a mandatory feature for all political subdivisions. 
For example, the court in Charlton County considered a broader array of 
“[a]ttributes that tend to establish that an entity is governmental in nature 
includ[ing]: that it is a creature of specific legislative enactment, that it has 
sovereign immunity, that it may exercise the right of eminent domain, that it is 
tax-exempt, that it has the power to tax, and that it receives tax revenues.”88 
There, the court concluded that the debtor was a governmental unit,89 in part, 
because it was “a creature of specific legislative enactment,” could “exercise the 
right of eminent domain to acquire property,” was “exempt from paying taxes 
in the same way cities and counties are exempt from taxes for the operation of 
similar facilities,” was “authorized to receive tax revenues from the County’s 
general fund or from an ad valorem tax,” and was “also authorized to issue tax-
exempt revenue anticipation certificates which are declared to be issued for an 
essential public and governmental purpose.”90 The debtor lacked sovereign 
immunity and the power to levy taxes directly, but the court found that entity 
may be a governmental unit if it enjoys “numerous governmental powers.”91 
B. Application to Public IHEs 
This section applies the three factors just identified from the case law to 
public IHEs. It concludes that in many states, courts are likely to determine that 
public IHEs are political subdivisions. As such, they are eligible only for 
bankruptcy relief under chapter 9, if at all.  
 
 86 In re Seven Ctys. Srvcs., 550 B.R. 741, 758 (W.D. Ky. 2016). 
 87 Id.  
 88 United States v. Hosp. Auth. of Charlton Cty. (In re Hosp. Auth. of Charlton Cty.), No. 12-50305, 2012 
Bankr. LEXIS 3042, at *1 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. July 3, 2012); see also In re Lombard Public Facilities Corp., 579 
B.R. 493 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2017) (suggesting that the phrase “governmental unit” denotes an entity “actually 
carrying out some governmental function” and finding that “a commercial enterprise which competes with others 
in the hotel and convention center industry” is not such a function). 
 89 While “[t]he definition of ‘governmental unit’ is broader than the definition of ‘municipality,’” the 
same factors are relevant to both inquiries. In re Hosp. Auth. of Charlton Cty., No. 12-50305, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 
3042, at *14. 
 90 Id. at *16. 
 91 Id. at *7 (specifically noting that sovereign immunity “is only one of many traditional government 
attributes that an entity may possess”). 
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The determinative factor in In re Sullivan County Regional Refuse Disposal 
District and In re Boise County was the states’ own description of the entities as 
“a body politic.”92 At least twenty-one states define one or more of their state 
universities as a “body politic and corporate.”93 Thus, under the Sullivan/Boise 
test, public IHEs in these states would be considered municipalities. 
Additionally, some states describe their public IHE systems as an “arm of the 
state,” which seems sufficiently analogous that a court is likely to determine that 
those entities are also political subdivisions.94 
By contrast, Orange County and similar cases focused on whether the debtor 
entity had sovereign powers, including “the power to tax, the power of eminent 
domain or the police power.”95 Exactly how much or how many sovereign 
powers a debtor must exercise to be a political subdivision is unclear. For 
example, the court in Orange County’s language is phrased in the disjunctive, 
suggesting that the ability to exercise even a single sovereign power may be 
sufficient for an entity to be considered a political subdivision.96 However, the 
Charlton County court suggested that an entity needed “numerous” sovereign 
powers to be considered a governmental unit.97 
Public IHEs are often created by specific legislative enactment, enjoy 
sovereign immunity as an “arm of the state,”98 are sometimes authorized to 
 
 92 In re Sullivan Cty. Reg’l Refuse Disposal Dist., 165 B.R. 60, 73 (Bankr. C.D.N.H. 1994); In re Boise 
Cty., 465 B.R. 156, 167 (Bankr. C.D. Idaho 2011) (citing McKinney’s Racing, Pari-Mutuel Wagering and 
Breeding Law § 603(1), which describes OTB as a “body corporate and politic”); cf. In re N.Y.C. Off-Track 
Betting Corp., 427 B.R. 256 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010).  
 93 This information was gathered by going through each individual state’s laws about the public college 
to determine how each state classified its own state school. The list includes Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, New Hampshire New 
Jersey, North Carolina Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Utah. 
 94 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 76-3304 (West 2018); MO. ANN. STAT. § 173.360 (West 2018); Sussex 
Commons Assocs. LLC v. Rutgers, 210 N.J. 531, 543–44 (2012) (noting that an institution may be an arm of 
the state for some purposes, but not others).  
 95 In re Cty. of Orange, 183 B.R. 594, 602 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995); see also In re Sullivan Cty. Reg’l 
Refuse Disposal Dist., 165 B.R. 60; In re Las Vegas Monorail Co., 429 B.R. 770, 795 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2010) 
(“No one seriously contends that LVMC is a political subdivision or agency of the State of Nevada. It has no 
power to tax, no power of eminent domain, and no sovereign immunity.”). 
 96 In re Cty. of Orange, 183 B.R. at 602 (stating that “[t]he common thread that ties these entities together 
is their ability to exercise various sovereign powers such as the power to tax, the power of eminent domain or 
the police power.”). Similarly, the court stated that the debtor in Orange County was not “similar in any other 
respect to the political subdivisions described.” Id. (emphasis added); see also In re Las Vegas Monorail Co., 
429 B.R. 770, 797 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2010) (finding that the debtor was not a municipality because it exercised 
“no traditional public powers: it cannot tax; it cannot condemn by eminent domain; and it has no sovereign 
immunity.”). 
 97 United States v. Hosp. Auth. of Charlton Cty. (In re Hosp. Auth. of Charlton Cty.), No. 12-50305, 2012 
Bankr. LEXIS 3042, at *7 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. July 3, 2012). 
 98 See Glenn M. Wong & Karen R. Skinner, Sovereign Immunity Saves a University’s Employees, 
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exercise the power of eminent domain, can often issue tax-exempt bonds, and 
are themselves tax-exempt.99 In addition and unlike the investment pool in 
Orange County, most public IHEs may exercise eminent domain.100 However, 
while public IHEs have numerous attributes of a sovereign (at least under 
Charlton County’s broader conception of this term), they do not clearly possess 
the power to tax or police powers.101 Thus, public IHEs appear to sit somewhere 
in between the debtor in Orange County that lacked any sovereign powers and 
an entity exercising every sovereign power. 
But no court has required an entity exercise every sovereign power. As a 
result, whether a court follows the Orange County or Charlton County test, it is 
likely that a public IHE would be considered a political subdivision.  
C. The Instrumentality of the State Case Law 
A public IHE might also qualify as a municipality if it is an “instrumentality 
of the state.” Once again, there are only a small handful of cases that have 
grappled directly with the question of whether an entity is an instrumentality.102 
This section also reviews case law that addressed the broader question of 
whether an entity is a governmental unit because these cases may be helpful in 
understanding the narrower question of whether an entity is an instrumentality. 
The central inquiry in many of the instrumentality cases is “whether the 
authority or agency is subject to control by public authority, state or 
municipal.”103 But the precise degree of requisite control is not particularly clear 
 
ATHLETIC BUS. (Feb. 2000), https://www.athleticbusiness.com/sovereign-immunity-saves-a-university-s-
employees.html (discussing cases involving claims of sovereign immunity for public colleges and their 
officials). But see Jon Campisi, Attorneys: Sovereign Immunity Won’t Shield Penn State from Sex Abuse Claims, 
LEGAL NEWSLINE (Nov. 16, 2011), http://legalnewsline.com/stories/510525862-attorneys-sovereign-immunity-
won-t-shield-penn-state-from-sex-abuse-claims. 
 99 Minutes of the Board of Regents of Higher Education for the State of Montana (May 29, 2003), 
https://mus.edu/board/meetings/Archives/ITEM119-112-R0503BondResol.pdf (on Montana’s tax-exempt bond 
issuances). 
 100 See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 85-133 (LexisNexis 2020); CAL EDUC. CODE § 94500 (LexisNexis 
2020); Kevin Kiley, Change is Eminent, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Sept. 19, 2012), https://www.insidehighered.com/ 
news/2012/09/19/ball-state-use-eminent-domain-spotlights-rare-potent-tool-state-universities. 
 101 But see In re Las Vegas Monorail Co., 429 B.R. at 799 (“Again, consistent with the origins of municipal 
bankruptcy, the key is the power to tax”). 
 102 See In re Hosp. Auth. of Charlton Cty., LEXIS 3042; see also In re Barnwell Cty. Hosp., 471 B.R. 849 
(Bankr. D.S.C. 2011); In re Las Vegas Monorail Co., 429 B.R. 770; In re Cty. of Orange, 183 B.R. 594 (Bankr. 
C.D. Cal. 1995); Ky. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Seven Ctys. Servs. (In re Seven Ctys. Servs.), 550 B.R. 741 (Bankr. 
W.D. Ky. 2014). 
 103 See, e.g., In re Barnwell Cty. Hosp., 471 B.R. at 859 (citing In re Connector 2000 Ass’n, 447 B.R. 752 
(Bankr. D.S.C. 2011)); ex parte York Cty. Nat. Gas Ass’n, 238 F. Supp. 964 (D.S.C. 1965), modified by 352 
F.2d 78 (4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 970 (1966); cf. In re Las Vegas Monorail Co., 429 B.R. 770; In 
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from the cases. For example, in In re Barnwell County Hospital,104 the debtor 
was an entity created by the South Carolina Legislature to provide hospital 
facilities to residents of Barnwell County. A party-in-interest objected to 
confirmation of the hospital’s bankruptcy plan, arguing that the hospital was 
ineligible for relief under chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code. The court disagreed, 
determining that the hospital was a municipality within the meaning of § 109(c) 
because it was an instrumentality of the state.105 
The court’s analysis centered on the degree of control exercised by the 
County Council over the hospital. The court determined that the hospital was 
under a sufficient degree of control because: (i) “[t]he Debtor [hospital] is 
operated by a Board of Directors, which is comprised of members who are 
appointed by the County Council or are employees of the Debtor [hospital];” (ii) 
“[t]he County Council created the Board and conveyed its powers and duties by 
ordinance;” and (iii) “[t]he Board reports to the County Council, and the 
Hospital’s budget is subject to County Council approval.”106 The result of this 
governing structure, the court concluded, was that the County Council ultimately 
controlled the hospital because the citizens of Barnwell County elected its 
members.107  
 
re Westport Transit Dist., 165 B.R. 93, 96 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1994); In re Hosp. Auth. of Charlton Cty., LEXIS 
3042. To aid their inquiry, courts often turn to the dictionary definition of “instrumentality,” but usually report 
that the definition is too ambiguous to be useful. See, e.g., In re Seven Ctys. Servs., 550 B.R. at 756 (citing the 
instrumentality definition from BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 919 (10th ed. 2014), as “(1) ‘A thing used to 
achieve an end or purpose’; and (2) ‘A means or agency through which a function of another entity is 
accomplished, such as a branch of a governing body[,]’” but pointing out that “the word’s plain meaning is 
unhelpful for determining what qualifies as an ‘instrumentality of the state’ under the Bankruptcy Code.”). There 
was some suggestion in In re Seven Ctys. Servs., 550 B.R. at 760 that it was relevant that the debtor was a private 
charitable organization, not created by the Commonwealth of Kentucky. But a close reading of that case finds 
that the court does not appear to assign any significant weight to this fact. Id. In any event, public IHEs are not 
private enterprises. 
 104 In re Barnwell Cty. Hosp., 471 B.R. 849.  
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. at 860. But see In re Las Vegas Monorail Co., 429 B.R. at 797 (finding the debtor was not an 
instrumentality, despite the need for the governor to approve the debtor’s fare structure and budget, and to 
appoint its directors, because the debtor “operates its day-to-day business in significant isolation from the 
State.”). 
 107 In re Barnwell Cty. Hosp., 471 B.R. at 860. By contrast, the County of Orange court determined that 
an entity that was an instrumentality of a county was not a municipality because it was not an instrumentality of 
the state. In re Cty. of Orange, 183 B.R. at 603. This appears to be different from the conclusion reached by 
Barnwell County. However, one difference may be that in County of Orange, there was “no enactment of the 
California legislature creates or establishes the [debtor] as a political subdivision, public agency or 
instrumentality of the State of California.” In re Cty. of Orange, 183 B.R. at 600. By contrast, the debtor in 
Barnwell County was created through an act of the South Carolina legislature. In re Barnwell Cty. Hosp., 471 
B.R. at 853. 
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Similarly, in Las Vegas Monorail, the Governor had the authority to approve 
the prices the debtor charged and its overall budget, and to appoint its 
directors.108 Yet the court found that the debtor was not an instrumentality 
because it operated “its day-to-day business in significant isolation from the 
State” and “[i]ts creditors are not, and do not expect to be, creditors of the 
State.”109 The court noted that “[w]hile the elements of control are many . . . 
these controls go to the service LVMC provides and not to protection of 
Nevada’s finances.”110 Similarly, the Seven Counties court found that an entity 
is not an instrumentality merely because it owes its existence, in part, to state 
action, or because an entity has an ongoing relationship with the state through 
regulation and because it contracts with the state for the vast majority of its 
revenue.111 
In addition to considering how a state government might exercise control 
over an entity, courts have also considered the purpose of such control.112 For 
example, in Seven Counties, the court noted that “[i]f the government’s control 
is meant to protect the government’s finances or the public fisc, then the entity 
is an instrumentality of the government. On the other hand, if the government’s 
control ‘is more akin to oversight or regulation, then the entity is not an 
instrumentality.’”113 In Seven Counties, the court concluded that an entity was 
not an instrumentality merely because the state government could “impact Seven 
Counties’ ‘structure, funding, budget and operations,’” because Seven Counties 
relied on state money, or because the state could “name a caretaker for CMHCs 
or even revoke recognition of the CMHCs.”114 While these factors undoubtedly 
constitute some degree of control over the debtor, the court concluded “that 
Kentucky’s power over Seven Counties is limited to largely typical oversight 
 
 108 In re Las Vegas Monorail Co., 429 B.R. at 797. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. 
 111 In re Seven Ctys. Servs. 550 B.R. 741, 756 (W.D. Ky. 2016). By contrast, in In re N.Y.C. Off-Track 
Betting Corp., 427 B.R. 256, 266 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010), the court highlighted that the debtor was “a creation 
of the state, made for the purpose of operating a ‘revenue producing enterprise.’” 
 112 In re Las Vegas Monorail Co., 429 B.R. at 789 (noting that “the type of control is critical. If the control 
retained or exercised is necessary or designed to allow the State to manage its finances or its fisc—the traditional 
concerns of Chapter 9—then the entity is an instrumentality. If the control, however, is more akin to oversight 
or regulation, then the entity is not an instrumentality.”) (citing In re Ellicott Sch. Bldg. Auth., 150 B.R. 261, 
263 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1992), and In re Greene Cty. Hosp., 59 B.R. 388, 389 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1986)).  
 113 In re Seven Ctys. Servs., 550 B.R. at 758 (internal citation omitted); see also In re Las Vegas Monorail 
Co., 429 B.R. at 797 (“Another way to frame this question is to ask whether LVMC operates in place of the State 
or whether its operations are simply subject to regulation to ensure that LVMC’s decisions further the public 
good.”).  
 114 In re Seven Ctys. Servs., 550 B.R. at 758. 
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and regulation.”115 To justify a conclusion that an entity was an instrumentality 
of the state, the court suggested that it might expect that (i) the state might retain 
some control over the appointment of some or all of the entity’s board of 
directors, or its officers, executives, or employees,116 (ii) the entity’s employees 
might qualify as public employees,117 (iii) the state would be able to take away 
the entity’s corporate status, or otherwise force the entity to close, or (iv) that 
the state “can ‘seize or exercise dominion’ over Seven Counties’ property.”118  
By contrast, other courts have focused less on the indicia of control and more 
on whether state control was directed toward the debtor’s day-to-day 
operations.119 For example, in Las Vegas Monorail, the court concluded that the 
debtor was not a municipality despite numerous indicia of control because “[t]he 
day-to-day operations are still within the purview of LVMC’s officers and 
employees, without any direct control from a State official.”120 Similarly, in In 
re Lombard Public Facilities Corp., the court required that, for an entity to be 
considered a municipality, there be “an active relationship with federal, state or 
municipal governments and that [the entity] carry out governmental 
functions.”121 
 
 115 Id. 
 116 This alone does not appear to be sufficient, however. See In re Las Vegas Monorail Co., 429 B.R. at 
797 (finding that the debtor was not an instrumentality, despite the Nevada Governor having the power to appoint 
the debtor’s directors, among other indicia of control); see also In re Lombard Pub. Facilities Corp., 579 B.R. 
493, 500 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2017) (finding that the debtor was not an instrumentality because while the “Village 
appoints the Debtor’s directors . . . it does not control its operations or management.”).  
 117 Although the debtor’s employees participated in the state’s retirement system, they were not paid 
according to the state salary schedules, nor were they subject to “any other state personnel regulations.” In re 
Seven Ctys. Servs., 511 B.R. at 466 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2014), affm’d in part, rev’d in part by In re Seven Ctys. 
Servs., 550 B.R. 741 (W.D. Ky. 2016). The court concluded this was insufficient to find that Seven Counties’ 
employees were state employees. In re Seven Ctys. Servs., 511 B.R. at 466. Employees may also be state 
employees for some purposes, but not others. See Sussex Commons Assocs. LLC v. Rutgers, 210 N.J. 531, 545–
46 (2012) (discussing whether Rutgers University “teaching faculty are State employees [for] all purposes” and 
concluding that they are not) (citing In re Exec. Comm’n on Ethical Standards, 561 A.2d 542, 548 (1989). 
 118 In re Seven Ctys. Servs., 550 B.R. at 758–59. 
 119 See In re Las Vegas Monorail Co., 429 B.R. at 797; see also In re Lombard Pub. Facilities Corp., 579 
B.R. at 500. 
 120 In re Las Vegas Monorail Co., 429 B.R. at 797. 
 121 In re Lombard Pub. Facilities Corp., 579 B.R. at 500; Travis A. McRoberts & Karol K. Denniston, 
Chapter 11 or Chapter 9: Investors Beware, NAT’L L. REV. (July 31, 2018), https://www.natlawreview.com/ 
article/chapter-11-or-chapter-9-investors-beware (reporting that the court found it important to note that the 
corporation had day-to-day operational control over the enterprise and that the corporation’s management did 
not report directly to the Village). 
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D. Application to Public IHEs 
Turning now to the application of the rules that we have extracted from the 
instrumentality-of-the-state cases, we see that the degree of control over the 
public IHE is often the paramount question in determining whether the IHE is a 
municipality. More particularly, the following questions all rise to the fore: (1) 
whether the public IHE has been created by an act of the State legislature, (2) 
whether an agent of the state, such as the governor, appoints the public IHE’s 
board of trustees, approves its budget, or oversees day-to-day managerial 
questions, such as the tuition it may charge, the number of students it can enroll, 
or the courses it may offer, and (3) whether the public IHE relies on direct state 
appropriations. Given these criteria, some public IHEs will almost certainly 
qualify as municipalities. 
Public IHEs are generally creatures of the State in which they reside, being 
both created and controlled by State legislatures.122 Public IHEs are generally 
created through a legislative act.123 For example, an Idaho teacher’s college—
Albion State Normal School—“was created by an act of the Idaho legislature in 
1893.”124 And, most public IHEs have some or all of their Board of Trustees 
appointed by the state governor.125 New Jersey’s public IHEs, for instance, are 
subject to oversight by a Board of Governors, most of which are appointed by 
the Governor and confirmed by the New Jersey State Senate.126 In addition, New 
Jersey has specifically designated Rutgers “as an instrumentality of the State for 
providing public higher education.”127 
 
 122 IHEs are delegated their powers through state laws and the charters that establish the institution.  
 123 However, some IHEs are called for in a state’s constitution. See, e.g., Paul Batesel, State Normal and 
Industrial School, LOST COLLEGES, http://www.lostcolleges.com/state-normal-and-industrial-school (last 
visited May 18, 2020) (“North Dakota Normal and Industrial School was constitutionally established as State 
Industrial School in 1889, with 40,000 acres of land to pay for its maintenance.”). 
 124 Paul Batesel, Albion State Normal School, LOST COLLEGES, http://www.lostcolleges.com/albion-
normal-college (last visited May 18, 2020).  
 125 See Bruckner, Bankrupting, supra note 8, at 718 (discussing the ways that Ohio exercises control over 
Cleveland State University by appointing the IHE’s board of trustees). 
 126 Rutgers, Bylaws of the Board of Trustees (Mar. 26, 2019), https://governingboards.rutgers.edu/sites/ 
default/files/00038416.PDF. 
 127 Dane, supra note 1, at 382 (“In 1945, the Legislature enacted chapter 49, Laws of New Jersey 1945, 
declaring that the school be ‘designated as the State University of New Jersey to be utilized as an instrumentality 
of the State for providing public higher education and thereby to increase the efficiency of the public school 
system of the State.’”) (citing Act of June 5, 1945, ch. 49, § 1, 1945 N.J. Laws 115, 127); see also Sussex 
Commons Assocs. LLC v. Rutgers, 210 N.J. 531, 542 (2012) (describing Rutgers as “a hybrid institution—at 
one and the same time private and public, with the State being granted a major voice in management, and the 
designation ‘State University’; and the institution being granted private autonomy and control of physical 
properties and assets.”). 
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Public IHEs typically receive a direct appropriation from the State in which 
they reside, and, therefore, the State exercises some degree of direct budgetary 
control over them.128 At Rutgers, which describes itself as “the state of New 
Jersey’s preeminent comprehensive public institution of higher education,”129 
the school’s budget is subject to approval by the state legislature.130 Some states 
take an even more active role in directing their IHEs and commandeering their 
day-to-day operations. For example, South Carolina lawmakers have weighed 
in on the curriculum at two public colleges, threatening to cut off funding 
because “incoming first-year students were asked to read books that discuss 
homosexuality.”131  
There is no question that the state often has significant control over public 
IHEs.132 However, to qualify as a municipality, an entity must not just be subject 
to government control; it must also serve a public purpose. Public IHEs should 
easily qualify because educating the populace is a traditional function of 
government.133 While private institutions may also serve this function, public 
IHEs surely serve a public purpose. As such, public IHEs are intended to be 
instrumentalities of the state.  
Other factors also suggest that public IHEs are municipalities. For example, 
employees of public IHEs are usually considered public sector employees. They 
are subject to oversight by the state legislature and are subject to certain 
disclosures not relevant to private sector employees. For example, the salaries 
of most public IHE employees are generally publicly available. Other rules 
concerning state employees, including the right to participate in state retirement 
schemes, also generally apply to public IHE employees.134  
 
 128 Bruckner, Bankrupting, supra note 8, at 718 (discussing the ways that Ohio exercises control over 
Cleveland State University through the grant of state funds). 
 129 Summer Session New Brunswick, RUTGERS (2020), https://summersession.rutgers.edu/precollege-
academies/about-rutgers. 
 130 Jonathan Lai, N.J. Colleges Ask: Why Does Christie Want to Cut Student Success Program?, THE 
INQUIRER (Mar. 13, 2017), http://www.philly.com/philly/education/Gov-Chris-Christie-NJ-budget-proposal-
cuts-EOF-college-aid-program.html. 
 131 Adrienne Lu, Brandishing Budget Power, State Lawmakers Pressure Public Universities, PEW 
(Apr. 24, 2014), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2014/04/24/brandishing-
budget-power-state-lawmakers-pressure-public-universities (discussing numerous other examples of state 
control of day-to-day operations). 
 132 Dane, supra note 1, at 391–99 (discussing the “pervasive fluidity of those nagging categories of 
‘public’ and ‘private’” and discussing examples that show that “[t]he line between ‘public’ and ‘private’ arises 
in many contexts and is contested in most of them.”). 
 133 In re Las Vegas Monorail Co., 429 B.R. 770, 797 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2010) (noting that “education, for 
example, may be a traditional governmental function.”). 
 134 Karen Eilers Lahey, et al., Retirement Plans for College Faculty at Public Institutions, 17 FIN. SERVS. 
REV. 323, 324 (2008) (“College professors who teach at public institutions of higher education have historically 
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Although the precise degree of governmental control over IHEs varies from 
institution to institution and from state to state, public IHEs are, as a general rule, 
instrumental in furthering essential government functions, and the state 
governments have at least some say in the management of those entities. Given 
the limited and somewhat muddled case law, courts may not conclude that every 
public IHE is an instrumentality. But it seems more likely than not that a court 
would conclude that a public IHE is an instrumentality of the state and therefore 
a municipality for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.  
E. The Public Agency Case Law 
Finally, a public IHE might also be a municipality (and thus required to file 
under chapter 9) if it is a “public agency.”135 While not defined by the 
Bankruptcy Code, the term “public agency” was defined by the Code’s 
precursor, the Bankruptcy Act, and that definition remains relevant. Section 
81(6) of the Bankruptcy Act defined public agencies as “incorporated 
authorities, commissions, or similar public agencies organized for the purpose 
of constructing, maintaining and operating revenue producing enterprises . . . 
.”136 Only three cases appear to squarely address whether a debtor is a public 
agency, and none provide much analysis. In In re New York City Off-Track 
Betting Corp., the court merely asserted that “NYC OTB is a creation of the 
state, made for the purpose of operating a “‘revenue producing enterprise.’”137 
Similarly, in In re County of Orange, the court asserted that “the [debtor] is not 
a public agency as that term is used in § 81(6) because the [debtor] was not 
organized for the purpose of maintaining or operating a revenue producing 
enterprise.”138 Even without in-depth analysis of these issues, we can see that 
both legislative intent and revenue generation are important to consider. 
Finally, the court in In re Westport Transit District concluded that the debtor 
was a public agency but failed to discuss revenue at all in its analysis.139 Instead, 
the court focused on the following factors: was the entity created pursuant to a 
state statute, was a body politic and corporate, the state’s control over the entity 
(e.g., its board was appointed by the government, the state could establish the 
 
been enrolled in defined benefit (DB) plans that are provided by their institution and may be sponsored by state 
governments.”). 
 135 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) (2019). 
 136 In re Cty. of Orange, 183 B.R. 594, 602 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995) (internal citations omitted); see Act 
of Aug. 16, 1937, ch. 657, 30 Stat. 544. 
 137 In re N.Y.C. Off-Track Betting Corp., 427 B.R. 256, 265 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 138 In re Cty. of Orange, 183 B.R. at 602. 
 139 In re Westport Transit District, 165 B.R. 93, 96 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1994). 
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entity’s prices and direct the entity’s revenue to third parties), and the entity’s 
possession of sovereign power (e.g., it had the power of eminent domain).140 
Somewhat unhelpfully, these are the same factors that other courts have used 
when discussing whether an entity is an instrumentality or a political 
subdivision. As such, they do not add to our ability to assess whether a public 
IHE is a municipality.  
F. Application to Public IHEs 
Despite the paucity of analysis on the public agency issue, we can extract 
some guidance on whether a court is likely to find that a public IHE is a public 
agency. Legislative statements or intent and an entity’s design are likely 
probative of whether the legislature intended to create a “revenue producing 
enterprise.”141 Applying this limited guidance to public IHEs, we can conclude 
that many public IHEs are likely to be public agencies. 
Public IHEs are revenue-producing enterprises. Even though public IHEs 
tend to offer education at a substantial discount to private colleges, all public 
IHEs charge at least some tuition. For three examples, in 2016 the Ohio State 
University, Rutgers, State University of New Jersey, and Florida State 
University systems had revenues of at least $5.1 billion, $3.5 billion and $1.1 
billion, respectively.142 Analogizing from New York City Off-Track Betting 
Corp., this alone would appear to be sufficient.  
* * * 
It seems that there are several good arguments that public IHEs are 
municipalities for chapter 9 purposes. Many, if not most, public IHEs are likely 
instrumentalities because they are subject to significant control by the State. 
Others are likely political subdivisions because they are characterized as a “body 
politic and corporate” and exercise a significant degree of sovereign power. 
Finally, others are likely public agencies because they are revenue-producing 
enterprises. It is also important to note that Collier’s—the preeminent 
bankruptcy treatise—takes the view that Congress did not want to unduly restrict 
 
 140 Id. at 95–96. 
 141 In re N.Y.C. Off-Track Betting Corp., 427 B.R. at 265; see In re Westport Transit, 165 B.R. 93 (Bankr. 
D. Conn. 1994); In re Cty. of Orange, 183 B.R. 594. 
 142 2017 Annual Financial Report, THE OHIO STATE UNIV. 20 (2017), https://busfin.osu.edu/sites/default/ 
files/ohiostate_financialreport2017.pdf; Financial Report 2015–2016, RUTGERS THE STATE UNIV. OF N.J. 20–
21 (2016), https://uco.rutgers.edu/files/rutgers-fiscal-year-2016-financial-report0pdf; Annual Report 2015–
2016, FLA. STATE UNIV. 10–11 (2016), https://controller.vpfa.fsu.edu/sites/default/files/media/doc/Financial_ 
Rep/Annual_Reports/2015_2016%20Annual%20Report.pdf. 
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eligibility for chapter 9 relief and thus courts may be inclined to give effect to 
Congress’ intent to have chapter 9 be broadly applicable.143 Municipal 
bankruptcy scholars, such as Professor Laura Napoli Coordes, also agree that 
chapter 9 should not be unduly restrictive.144 As such, it seems that—under 
existing doctrine and policy—public IHEs are likely eligible to file bankruptcy 
in chapter 9, if they are eligible at all. That being settled—to the extent 
possible—as a descriptive matter, this Article next turns to the normative 
question of who is best situated to avoid the financial distress of public IHEs.  
IV. WHO CAN AVOID THE FINANCIAL DISTRESS OF 
PUBLIC IHES? 
When a public IHE becomes financially distressed, there are three primary 
options for who should bear the burden of the entity’s debt: the residual claimant 
(who are, in the case of cities, often thought to be the city’s residents), the 
creditors, or the state.145 Thus, the goal of this section is to consider which party 
is best situated to prevent public IHEs from becoming financially distressed or, 
if financial distress is unavoidable, which party is best situated to resolve the 
public IHE’s financial issues. This analysis will assist in determining whether 
distressed public IHEs should be allowed to reorganize in bankruptcy (shifting 
the burden to creditors) or not (forcing “residents” or the state to repay the 
entity’s debts). In the context of financially distressed cities, municipal 
bankruptcy scholars have reached different conclusions about which entity is 
best positioned to avoid municipal financial distress or bear the costs of 
 
 143 6 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 900.02[1] (16th ed. 2009) (“the eligibility requirements for relief under 
chapter 9 should be construed broadly”). Of course, states remain the ultimate decision-makers about municipal 
eligibility for chapter 9.  
 144 Coordes, Gatekeepers Gone Wrong: Reforming the Chapter 9 Eligibility Rules, supra note 73, at 1231–
32. 
 145 Scholars have tended to focus on three possible parties who might be the superior risk bearer: local 
residents, creditors, and the state. See Kevin Kordana, Tax Increases in Municipal Bankruptcies, 83 VA. L. REV. 
1035, 1096–1105 (1997) (“[b]ondholders are, on average, better risk-bearers than municipal residents”); see also 
Omer Kimhi, Reviving Cities: Legal Remedies to Municipal Financial Crises, 88 B.U. L. REV. 633, 656–72 
(2008) (considering whether “the residents, the creditors, or the state—is the most effective risk bearer of a 
municipal financial crisis.”); Picker & McConnell, supra note 38, at 437; Vincent S.J. Buccola, The Logic and 
Limits of Municipal Bankruptcy Law, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 817, 840 (2019) (“the owners of locally situated real 
estate are, after a fashion, the residual beneficiaries of municipal policy and action, and in that sense resemble 
corporate stockholders . . . .”) [hereinafter, Buccola, Limits]; Clayton P. Gillette & David A. Skeel, Jr., 
Governance Reform and the Judicial Role in Municipal Bankruptcy, 125 YALE L.J. 1150, 1154 (2016) (“Ideally, 
the outside catalyst would be the state, which retains substantial authority over its political subdivisions. But 
political entrenchment may also constrain the state from inducing or imposing structural reforms that are needed 
for fiscal stability.”). 
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resolving those financial issues.146 This section will apply their lessons to the 
case of public IHEs.  
Unfortunately, there is not a clear analogy between cities and public colleges 
in terms of who is the most efficient risk bearer. Nevertheless, this Article will 
consider the same three parties—“residents,” creditors, and the state. It 
concludes that the superior risk bearer is not local residents (and, in this context, 
it is not even clear who counts as a local resident or how “local residents” could 
be forced to bear the cost of resolving a public IHE’s financial issues). But this 
Article does not firmly conclude whether creditors or the state is the optimal risk 
bearer. Instead, the decision will ultimately be a political one and different states 
may reasonably draw different conclusions on the appropriate answer. This 
conclusion has important implications for the normative question of whether 
many public IHE’s likely ineligibility for any type of bankruptcy relief is 
problematic.147 
A. Residents as Risk Bearers  
Various scholars, most notably Professors Picker and McConnell, have 
suggested that city residents may be ideally situated to avoid municipal financial 
distress.148 In the corporate context, shareholders are thought to be the superior 
risk bearer because they both control the entity’s decision-making (by electing 
the board of directors) and are the residual claimant.149 City residents are thought 
to be similar because they exert control over municipal decision-making by 
electing municipal officials and because (property-owning) residents can benefit 
if municipal investment increases the value of their property.150 As such, some 
 
 146 See Kordana, supra note 145, at 1039 (arguing that creditors are best situated to bear the risk of 
municipal default); see also Picker & McConnell, supra note 38, at 437 (focusing on residents); Kimhi, supra 
note 145, at 636 (claiming that “state financial boards, which place the burden of the crisis on the state—is the 
most efficient remedy for local crises.”); Gillette & Skeel, supra note 145, at 1154 (focusing on the state as the 
ideal party). 
 147 See Kordana, supra note 145, at 1043–46.  
 148 Picker & McConnell, supra note 38, at 437. 
 149 Kordana, supra note 145, at 1046. But see Robert K. Rasmussen, Taking Control Rights Seriously, 166 
U. PENN. L. REV. 1749, 1756 (2018) (arguing that “it would be a mistake to analogize [the election of the board 
of directors] to political contests” because board of director elections are normally not open contests). For 
distressed companies, many scholars assert that it is neither the board nor the shareholders that exert the most 
control over the entity, but the company’s creditors. See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Creditors’ Ball: The ‘New’ New 
Corporate Governance in Chapter 11, 152 U. PENN. L. REV. 917, 918 (2003). 
 150 See Buccola, Limits, supra note 145, at 847 (“In the municipal case, residents and (especially) land-
owners bear the primary residual interest in activities overseen by the mayor or council they elect, because the 
value of local real estate depends on, among other things, the relationship between taxes and the municipal 
infrastructure they procure.”). 
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argue that requiring residents to backstop the debts of distressed municipal 
entities is appropriate.151  
To allow losses to be foisted upon a different party would allow 
municipalities to act in a financially irresponsible manner, exacerbating 
problems of moral hazard, or so goes the argument.152 In other words, if elected 
officials are allowed to run up debts that city residents will never repay, cities 
may be prevented “from making efficient investments in particular parts of 
town” because lenders will refuse to lend in the first instance.153 By contrast, if 
city residents bear the risk of municipal default, city residents will elect more 
risk averse politicians, better monitor municipal spending, and be assured of the 
ability to borrow at reasonable rates in the future.154  
Even in the context of cities, this line of reasoning is suspect. There are at 
least four reasons to doubt that residents are best situated to control inappropriate 
risk-taking and overspending by most municipalities.155 And the case is even 
weaker when we turn to public IHEs. First, residents are poorly equipped to 
monitor free-spending local politicians and prevent them from making poor 
financial decisions.156 For example, Professor Kimhi contends that New York 
City officials knew they needed to make different financial decisions in the years 
leading up to the city’s financial crisis in the 1970s, but argues that officials were 
prevented from taking the necessary steps because of the city’s fragmented 
political environment, including concentrated interest groups, disorganized 
decision-making processes, and poor financial planning.157  
 
 151 Picker & McConnell, supra note 38, at 437; see also Kordana, supra note 145, at 1092. 
 152 See Picker & McConnell, supra note 38, at 475–76 (“Allowing a city to keep all of its assets while 
being discharged of its debts is the principal source of the moral hazard problem in municipal bankruptcy.”); see 
also Kordana, supra note 145, at 1067 (“The strongest argument for requiring a municipality to raise taxes in 
order to pay off general obligation bonds in full is that, otherwise, too many municipalities will seek Chapter 9 
protection, exploiting bondholders by paying them off in cents on the dollar under the terms of their 
reorganization plans.”). 
 153 See Picker & McConnell, supra note 38, at 426, 490–91. 
 154 See id. at 476; see also Buccola, Limits, supra note 145, at 840. 
 155 Kordana suggests that residents are to municipalities what shareholders are to corporations, but this 
comparison doesn’t hold when public IHEs are the municipal entity at issue. Kordana, supra note 145, at 1056 
(“Municipal residents have the functional relationship, vis-à-vis the municipality, of both the shareholders and 
the customers of a corporation.”); see also Buccola, Limits, supra note 145, at 847. 
 156 Kordana, supra note 145, at 1093 (“Monitoring by residents is likely to be weak in any event . . . .”); 
see also Kimhi, supra note 145, at 663 (“the causes of local financial crises are often out of the local officials’ 
realm of control, [as such] the state’s involvement is warranted.”); cf. Reid K. Weisbord, Charitable Insolvency 
and Corporate Governance in Bankruptcy Reorganization, 10 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 305, 316 (2014) (“the current 
legal regime inadequately holds charitable insiders accountable for breaching fiduciary duties.”). 
 157 See Kimhi, supra note 145, at 663 (“Clearly the officials understood the gravity of the city’s financial 
position, but the political environment did not allow them to take the steps needed for rehabilitation. The city 
was fragmented, its decision-making process was disorganized and lacked adequate financial planning, and 
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Second, “municipal opportunism” is constrained by municipalities’ need to 
borrow in the future, and thus their need to be perceived as an entity that repays 
its debts.158 Third, Professor Kordana asserts that bondholders are, on average, 
wealthier than the residents of distressed municipalities and therefore less risk 
averse. He argues that bondholders’ lower risk aversion makes them more 
suitable risk bearers because “risk is more efficiently borne by those who are 
less risk averse than by those who are more risk averse.”159  
Finally, lenders are already aware that losses can be shifted from parties who 
control an entity to those who have a contractual relationship with it, whether 
the debtor is in bankruptcy or otherwise.160 For example, a bankrupt entity can 
impose losses on its contractual counterparties by breaching executory contracts, 
such as employment contracts and collective bargaining agreements, and then 
paying creditors a fraction of what they would have been entitled to under the 
contract.161 Thus, the risk of loss is likely already priced into municipal 
borrowing.  
Although public IHEs are unlikely to use bankruptcy to shift losses its 
contractual counterparties, the other critiques of residents as superior risk 
bearers have bite in the context of public IHEs. And, if these critiques are not 
enough, the case for residents to backstop a municipality’s financial distress is 
even more difficult to support in the context of public IHEs. In the context of a 
public IHE-as-debtor, it is not even clear who is a “resident” in the sense that 
other municipal bankruptcy scholars have used the term.162 If a college 
refurbishes faculty and staff offices and then defaults on its construction loan, 
should faculty and staff have their salaries cut to repay creditors?163 Should all 
state residents have to pay higher taxes because of a failed investment in a public 
 
interest groups blocked any possibility of a significant change.”). 
 158 Kordana, supra note 145, at 1038–39, 1071–73 (arguing that sovereign borrowing is a prime example 
of “a real world situation that the moral hazard-driven analysis would predict to be characterized by an 
unwillingness to lend, and by debtor exploitation of creditors if money were lent, instead features willing lending 
and a seeming absence of significant problems of exploitation.”). 
 159 Id. at 1096–99. 
 160 Id. at 1058 (“Thus private law parallels, in which limited liability shifts losses in bankruptcy from 
control parties onto parties with contractual relationships with the bankrupt entity, suggest that a mandatory tax 
increase imposed on municipal residents in favor of bond-holders and other investors is neither an inevitable nor 
obviously correct default rule.”). 
 161 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2019). 
 162 Residents are only weakly similar to shareholders. While both have exit rights, those may be 
considerably easier and less expensive to exercise in the context of stock ownership (selling shares) than home 
ownership (moving). See Weisbord, supra note 156, at 321–22 (describing the methods corporate shareholders 
use “to monitor and regulate” corporate officers and directors).  
 163 In the case of tenured professors, it may be a breach of contract to decrease their pay. See generally 
Bruckner, Terminating Tenure, supra note 13. 
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IHE? Or maybe just nearby property owners who may see their property values 
increase.164 After all, these groups may benefit from the IHE’s (over)spending. 
Yet none of these parties are likely to have substantial control over the college’s 
decision-making165 and may not have consumed the goods or services that led 
to financial trouble in the first instance.166 Thus, in the context of public IHE-as-
debtor, “the relation between risk-creation and risk-bearing [is] tenuous.”167 
B. Creditors as Risk Bearers  
For every dollar improvidently borrowed, there was a dollar improvidently 
lent. In other words, creditors control a municipality’s access to money. In 
theory, creditors can use this leverage to force local politicians to take the steps 
necessary to either prevent financial distress or address problems once they 
arise.168 Professor Kordana notes that the “backdrop of state municipal finance 
law against which municipal borrowing occurs” may allow lenders to perfectly 
coordinate cutting a municipal [city] debtor off from additional borrowing.169 If 
they fail to do so, Kordana argues that creditors should bear the cost of their 
improvident lending.  
 
 164 Cf. Buccola, Limits, supra note 145. 
 165 A possible exception is faculty at a school that takes its commitment to shared governance seriously.  
 166 See Buccola, Limits, supra note 145, at 820 (arguing that the “beneficiaries of successful municipal 
government are not investors in that government (as shareholders are investors in a commercial firm), but are 
rather the owners of land under its authority.”). 
 167 Cf. Kordana, supra note 145, at 1101–02 (noting that the ability for “residents” to move “in and out of 
a municipality, makes the relation between risk-creation and risk-bearing even more tenuous.”). 
 168 Kimhi, supra note 145, at 661 (“The creditors, after all, control the locality’s most important resource 
—money—and this control may enable them to pressure the local officials into taking the steps creditors think 
necessary. Localities often need the funds that creditors supply, so officials are often coerced into following the 
creditors’ demands. The creditors can set the conditions for extending loans to the locality, and this gives them 
leverage to force the locality to undergo a recovery process. Moreover, since municipalities wish to pay the 
lowest interest rates they possibly can on their loans, the credit markets—even when the creditors are dispersed 
and unorganized—may push local officials to improve the local financial condition.”); Kordana, supra note 145, 
at 1099 (arguing that bondholders are wealthier and therefore less risk averse, making them more efficient risk 
bearers because “risk is more efficiently borne by those who are less risk averse than by those who are more risk 
averse.”); Rasmussen, supra note 149, at 1752 (noting that creditors as creditors are not entitled to control an 
entities’ decision-making, but noting that chapter 11 can change “creditors (or at least some of them) into” 
decision-makers); Weisbord, supra note 156, at 328 (describing “the senior lender” as having “substantial 
control over the debtor because it can withhold consent until the debtor agrees to replace blameworthy 
incumbents.”). 
 169 Kordana, supra note 145, at 1070; see also Adam C. Parker, Positive Liberty in Public Finance: State 
Oversight of Local-Government Debt and the North Carolina Model, 37 CAMPBELL L. REV. 107, 114 (2015) 
(some states “impose constitutional or statutory limitations on the type and amount of debt that local 
governments may incur, although local governments sometimes design creative ways to circumvent those 
limits.”). The restrictions Professor Kordana is concerned about may have more force (and therefore allow better 
coordination) in the context of cities-as-borrowers than in the case of IHE-as-borrower.  
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In the context of distressed business enterprises, many scholars have argued 
that pervasive creditor control is the norm.170 For example, Professor Rasmussen 
notes that “[i]t is now commonplace for creditors to be the driving force behind 
reorganization efforts” in chapter 11 cases.171 But there are several reasons to 
believe that this argument holds less weight in the context of distressed 
municipalities than in the corporate context, particularly when we focus on 
public IHEs. 
First, although public IHEs regularly borrow money, they do so far less 
frequently than for-profit companies.172 In addition, public IHEs often raise 
money by issuing tax-exempt, municipal bonds and thus their creditors are more 
likely to be somewhat dispersed cohorts of bondholders rather than banks or 
similar lenders.173 The nature of the creditor is important. As Professors Douglas 
Baird and Bob Rasmussen have noted, “[b]ondholders typically can do little 
until a corporation defaults on a loan payment. Even then, their remedies are 
limited. Not so with bank debt or debt issued by nonfinancial institutions.”174  
 
 170 See Anthony J. Casey, The Creditors’ Bargain and Option-Preservation Priority in Chapter 11, 78 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 759, 760, n.2 (“While it may seem strange to those unfamiliar with the current practice in 
bankruptcy, creditor control is a pervasive fact in corporate reorganization”); see also Skeel, supra note 149, at 
919 (“To an increasing extent, lenders are using these loan contracts to influence corporate governance in 
bankruptcy. The fate of an asset or division of the company, even the terms of a transfer of control, has been 
spelled out as terms in a debtor’s DIP financing agreement.”); Adam J. Levitin, Bankruptcy’s Lorelei: The 
Dangerous Allure of Financial Institution Bankruptcy, 97 N.C. L. REV. 243, 290 (2019) (arguing that “calling 
the shots” in a bankruptcy case is what DIP lenders do); cf. Laura N. Coordes, Beyond the Bankruptcy Code: A 
New Statutory Bankruptcy Regime for Tribal Debtors, 35 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 363, 405 (2019) (cautioning 
that undue influence not be accorded to lenders while arguing for new tribal bankruptcy legislation). 
 171 Rasmussen, supra note 149, at 1755.  
 172 See Weisbord, supra note 156, at 329–33 (2014) (noting that “[e]mpirical scholarship, while scarce, 
suggests that charities prefer to draw from internal capital sources rather than seek external debt financing from 
outside sources.”); Charlie Eaton, et al., Borrowing Against the Future: The Hidden Costs of Financing U.S. 
Higher Education, DEBT AND SOCIETY (May 22, 2014) at *10, http:// debtandsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2014/05/Borrowing_Against_the_Future_052214.pdf (reporting that borrowing is on the rise, with a near 
tripling of public IHE debt over ten years leading up to 2014).  
 173 Eaton, supra note 172, at 7–8 (2014) (describing the primary capital source of all non-profit IHEs as 
municipal bonds, but also noting that “[i]nvestment banking houses like JP Morgan and Barclays today have 
helped some higher education institutions to issue general revenue bonds that collateralize all college revenue 
in exchange for lower interest rates.”). 
 174 Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever of Corporate 
Governance, 154 U. PENN. L. REV. 1209, 1211, 1216 (2006) (“In the standard model, debt is diversely held 
among public bondholders who rely on an indenture trustee to guard their interests. The indenture trustee, 
however, can do no more than insist on rigid compliance with the bond covenants. She cannot exert any active 
role in the affairs of the corporation, as she lacks the power to alter the essential terms of the loan without the 
unanimous consent of the bondholders.”); see also Weisbord, supra note 156, at 327 (describing creditor control 
as stemming from the lender’s right to accelerate the repayment of preexisting debt and by offering to supply 
additional secured debt). 
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Additionally, the mechanisms by which creditors exert control include 
demanding seats on the board of directors of the borrowing entity, or the 
appointment of a chief restructuring officer.175 But these control mechanisms 
require the debtor’s consent, which, in the context of public IHEs, would likely 
require the consent of the state governor and, possibly, the legislature. It seems 
unlikely that the governor would appoint a creditor’s agents to a public IHE’s 
board of trustees in exchange for an emergency loan.176 Public IHEs are likely 
able to turn to alternative funding sources (i.e. the state treasury) if the lender’s 
terms are too onerous. By contrast, financially distressed companies’ most likely 
source of new funds are its existing lenders.177 
Second, even coordinated creditor activity is unlikely to cause a public IHE 
to increase revenue substantially for at least two reasons.178 The problems that 
confront public IHEs—“(i) growing competition for students, [and] (ii) 
declining state revenues devoted to higher education”—are largely outside of 
the control of school administrators.179 For example, community colleges 
generally have open admission policies and thus have an extremely limited 
ability to increase enrollment.180 As Professor Kimhi notes,  
[I]f the processes which cause the local financial decline are beyond 
the local officials’ realm of control, then creditors’ pressures directed 
at the local officials will also be ineffective. The creditors can signal 
to local officials that the locality’s financial condition has declined, but 
the officials themselves are often helpless in the face of the problems 
the locality confronts.181  
 
 175 Once a bankruptcy case has been commenced, creditors can also displace management through the 
appointment of a trustee. While this does not increase creditor control, it does eliminate the debtor’s control.  
 176 By contrast, “[f]ew companies that encounter financial distress have sufficient unencumbered assets to 
fund a Chapter 11 proceeding” without additional borrowing. Rasmussen, supra note 149, at 1767. 
 177 Id. at 1767 (“The most likely source of new funds or the ability to use cash on hand that is part of the 
lenders’ collateral package therefore lies with the existing lenders.”).  
 178 Id. at 1758 (pointing out that lenders may have substantial leverage, but have few legal rights to direct 
a debtor to act in a particular way). 
 179 Bruckner, DNRs, supra note 8, at 234 (internal citations omitted). See also Bruckner, Bankrupting, 
supra note 8, at 701 (“The higher education sector faces significant headwinds, including: (i) growing 
competition for a diminishing pool of students; (ii) technological change, such as the rise of online education; 
and (iii) stagnant family incomes.” (internal citations omitted)); Kimhi, supra note 145, at 662 (claiming that 
local “officials themselves may be unable to address the underlying causes of the financial deterioration.”). 
 180 Bruckner, DNRs, supra note 8, at 235 (“For instance, an IHE may not be able to raise additional tuition 
revenue if it already has an open enrollment policy or if it already significantly discounts its tuition to lure new 
students.” (internal citations omitted)); see also Bruckner, Bankrupting, supra note 8, at 703 (describing a 
college’s lack of selectivity as a risk factor for financial distress). Of course, some state schools are highly 
selective, but those are not the norm. 
 181 Kimhi, supra note 145, at 662 (“They cannot do much about a national recession, they are unable to 
stop suburbanization, and they certainly cannot compel the state to send more funds their way or force it to 
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In addition, Professor Kimhi argues that administrators “often lack the legal 
authority or the political power to take the required action.”182 As in cities, 
decision-making at public IHEs is also fractured. At public IHEs, authority is 
split across state legislatures (who control appropriations), the governor (who 
often appoints the entire Board of Trustees),183 the Board of Trustees (who 
approves the entity’s strategic plan and selects the IHE’s top administrators, 
among other things), the IHE’s administration (who manages overall budgeting), 
individual deans (who control day-to-day spending), and faculty (who may have 
a say in various decisions through shared governance mechanisms).184 
Nevertheless, for every dollar borrowed, there is a dollar lent. Even if 
creditors are unable to prevent financial crises ex ante or resolve it ex post, it is 
not clear why they should be absolved from having made non-performing loans 
in the first instance. Why should creditors not bear the cost of their lending 
decisions?185 At a minimum, creditors are probably better risk monitors than 
“residents” and thus are relatively more deserving to take unavoidable losses.186 
Allowing public IHEs to reorganize in bankruptcy could help force creditors to 
bear the risk of their improvident lending. Thus, it is an option that legislatures, 
especially Congress, should consider.  
C. State Financial Boards as Risk Bearers 
There are at least two reasons why intervention by the state government, 
through some sort of state financial board or emergency manager, might be the 
best way to avoid municipal financial distress.187 First, the state can change a 
 
decrease the amount of unfunded mandates.”). 
 182 Id. at 661–62 (“The reason is that while the creditors’ pressures are directed at local officials, the 
officials themselves may be unable to address the underlying causes of the financial deterioration. The creditors 
can try to force the local officials to take measures to rehabilitate the locality, but the local officials often lack 
the legal authority or the political power to take the required action.”). 
 183 See Bruckner, Bankrupting, supra note 8, at 718 (noting that the Governor of Ohio appoints all nine 
voting members of the Board of Trustees for Cleveland State University, a public IHE in Ohio). 
 184 Kimhi, supra note 145, at 661 (“[T]he creditors cannot implement the required economic reforms at 
the local level, and they also do not have the requisite legal powers to force the locality to take remedial action. 
Therefore, since the creditors are in a worse position than the state to avoid a local crisis or to minimize its 
consequences, it is less efficient to place the burden of the crisis on their shoulders.”). 
 185 Kordana, supra note 145, at 1058 (“[T]his Article suggests it also may place losses on those who have 
lent money to the municipality on contractual terms.”). 
 186 Id. at 1091 (“By monitoring who will be doing what with the borrowed money in a municipality, 
investors may be able not only to protect themselves by charging for opportunistic conduct ahead of time, but 
also, at least by charging higher rates, signal the rest of the municipality’s residents as to what is occurring. We 
should be confident that investors can monitor municipal borrowers.”). 
 187 See Kimhi, supra note 145, at 661 (describing the state as “the superior bearer of local insolvency 
because it can address the causes of a local crisis, or deal with its consequences, better than the creditors can.”); 
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municipality’s political environment because municipalities are creatures of the 
state in which they reside.188 For example, if a municipality’s decision-making 
process is too disorganized or fragmented to make the necessary changes, the 
state can literally remake the municipality’s structure by eliminating roles and 
consolidating positions.189 States may also use their financial resources as a 
carrot for municipal restructuring.190 Second, states have “broader legal 
authority than municipal officials” and may, therefore, be able to address certain 
issues that are beyond the reach of the municipal debtor’s authority.191  
In the context of distressed cities-as-municipalities, Kimhi argues that 
reforming a municipality’s tax system and reducing its labor costs are the two 
primary tasks of a municipal restructuring. There are clear parallels to distressed 
public IHEs, which also often need to right-size their faculties, better align 
faculty expertise with student demand, and ensure that they offer a 
competitively-priced degree.192  
And states do have some direct control over a public IHE’s financial matters. 
States sometimes force their public IHEs to merge.193 Some states also control 
tuition levels.194 And state legislative approval may be needed before a public 
 
see also Gillette & Skeel, supra note 145, at 1155 (“Where the state intervenes to redress structural difficulties 
that cause fiscal distress, there may be little need for bankruptcy court intervention.”). 
 188 See Gillette & Skeel, supra note 145, at 1154 (“Ideally, the outside catalyst would be the state, which 
retains substantial authority over its political subdivisions. But political entrenchment may also constrain the 
state from inducing or imposing structural reforms that are needed for fiscal stability.”). 
 189 See id. at 1184 (“The most common governance problem—our principal focus in the discussion that 
follows—is a fragmented local decision-making structure.”); Kimhi, supra note 145, at 664 (“[T]he state has the 
ability to change the political environment in the municipality, and thus the state can decrease the political 
pressures that contribute to overspending.”). 
 190 Buccola, Legislation, supra note 73, at 1328 (“Governors often have discretion to allocate funds for 
investments they deem useful for the general public. The governor could make clear to a municipal government 
that such funds will not be forthcoming if the city tries to force through a plan of adjustment he dislikes or, in 
the alternative, that a proposed infrastructure project looks promising if the city confirms a plan more amenable 
to his preferences. As a functional matter, bargaining leverage can look very similar to a formal veto power.”). 
 191 Kimhi, supra note 145, at 664 (“[T]he state has broader legal authority than municipal officials, and so 
it can better address the external socioeconomic processes”); see also Gillette & Skeel, supra note 145, at 1222 
(“acknowledging that states have political and institutional advantages over courts” in terms of their capacity 
“to restructure dysfunctional local governments”). 
 192 See, e.g., Bruckner, Terminating Tenure, supra note 13. 
 193 See notes 35–36, infra. 
 194 See, e.g., Robert Kelchen, Tuition Control Policies: A Challenging Approach to College Affordability, 
MHEC POLICY BRIEF (Aug. 2017), https://www.mhec.org/sites/default/files/resources/mhec_affordability_ 
series3_20170824.pdf (reporting on various ways to control tuition, including the express tuition caps or curbs 
reported by “[t]wenty-seven of 44 state higher education agencies that responded to a recent survey”). Although 
pricing is important, it seems that the variability in public IHE revenue streams are much more likely to come 
from the number of students that attend than the price of attendance (though they are related). State officials 
seem less likely to be able to encourage students to attend than the college administration, as it is the latter’s 
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IHE can grant tenure to faculty, and they could decline to do so, which could 
affect labor costs. 
Finally, states could decline to allow a distressed IHE to take on new debt 
through the issuance of municipal bonds.195 But in this regard, states are no more 
powerful than creditors who could refuse to underwrite that debt issuance or to 
buy the debt if it were offered anyway.196 
But consider other problems that public IHEs face, such as changing 
demographics.197 Many IHEs are receiving fewer applications these days. To the 
extent that this is a national trend, a state’s ability to alter decision-making at 
public IHEs and its greater legal authority are irrelevant. Public IHEs also face 
declining state support.198 Obviously, states are sometimes well situated to 
reverse that decline and increase appropriations for public IHEs. But if the 
problem is stagnating or declining state budgets, IHEs cannot get money from a 
stone. There may be greater legal authority but no difference in result. 
Finally, Professor Kimhi is correct that states have the ability to reshape a 
public IHE’s organizational structure to consolidate authority and avoid special 
interests exerting undue control.199 But while states may have the legal authority 
to adjust a public IHE’s governance structure, it is not clear that the state can or 
will exercise that authority.200 After all, if a public IHE has become financially 
distressed despite state oversight, then state control has already failed ex ante.201 
Anecdotes about the wholesale replacement of free-spending Boards of Trustees 
 
full-time job.  
 195 See Parker, supra note 169, at 114 (“Some states also review certain types of debt instruments and 
require state approval before issuing the debt”); Kordana, supra note 145, at 1050 (“GO [general obligation] 
bonds often require taxpayer approval before they can be issued . . . .”). 
 196 At least where coordinated creditor control is easy. See text accompanying supra note 169.  
 197 See Jacqueline Palochko, Kutztown University President: Higher Ed Institutions Must Adjust to 
Demographics, MORNING CALL (Mar. 8, 2019, 8:30 PM), https://www.mcall.com/news/education/mc-nws-
kutztown-legislative-breakfast-20190307-story.html (describing how some colleges respond to demographic 
shifts). For a description of other problems faced by IHEs, see also Bruckner, Bankrupting, supra note 8, at 701; 
Bruckner, DNRs, supra note 8, at 232–33; Bruckner, Terminating Tenure, supra note 13, at 257. 
 198 Michael Mitchell et al., supra note 13. 
 199 Buccola, Legislation, supra note 73, at 1326 (“A municipality’s veto power is, however, defeasible at 
the will of its state legislature, which can divest the municipality’s elected officials of their holdout threat, 
typically through the agency of an emergency manager or control board.”); see also Gillette & Skeel, supra note 
145, at 1152 (suggesting that “local fiscal crises usually are caused by a governance structure that tolerates 
financial decisions in which the benefits and costs of public expenditures are misaligned.”). 
 200 See Gillette & Skeel, supra note 145, at 1222 (highlighting at least two situations where states will be 
unable to reform municipal financial decision-making); Weisbord, supra note 156, at 316 (noting that sufficient 
oversight over the officers and directors of charities is often “inadequate[]”). 
 201 Gillette & Skeel, supra note 145, at 1223 (describing as “very common” that states fail to rein in flawed 
municipal financing decision-making even “in the face of fiscal distress”).  
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are hard to come by.202 As Professor Buccola argues, existing legal structures 
are “sticky” because change often requires a majority vote of “each legislative 
chamber, plus acquiescence by the governor.”203 Thus, it can be difficult for state 
governments to reform problematic governance structures in their public IHEs.  
The challenging political environment in state capitals can help explain why 
so many state legislatures delegate the difficult decision-making of municipal 
reform to emergency managers and state financial boards.204 However it is not 
particularly clear why state financial boards would be less subject to special 
interest politicking than appointed members of a college’s board of trustees.205 
After all, both are appointed by the governor or state legislature.  
* * * 
In conclusion, it appears that there are reasons to doubt that creditors or state 
financial boards are particularly well-situated to prevent public IHEs from 
becoming financially distressed or to bear the cost of responding to that financial 
distress. As a result, I believe it is appropriate for each state to reach its own 
conclusion about whether lenders should bear the cost of their non-performing 
loans or whether the state should repay creditors.206 In large part, I believe this 
decision will depend on several factors, including whether state officials believe 
that lenders knowingly assumed the risk of non-repayment, whether lenders are 
able to distinguish between public IHEs that remain good credit risks and those 
that are not (or if bond market contagion is a serious risk), and the state’s own 
financial health.  
V. HOW TO OPTIMIZE PUBLIC IHES’ FINANCIAL DISCIPLINE? 
This section will address the normative issue of whether public IHEs should 
be required to file bankruptcy under chapter 9. Alternatives include leaving 
creditors with state law collection remedies, or using a state financial board 
 
 202 It would be an interesting empirical project to examine how often trustees are replaced in the months 
leading up to and soon after an IHE’s financial crisis. Cf. Weisbord, supra note 156, at 309 (discussing how the 
bankruptcy court might “hasten[] the resignation or removal of blameworthy officers and directors”). 
 203 Buccola, Legislation, supra note 73, at 1323 (“Rules are sticky when only a majority in each legislative 
chamber, plus acquiescence by the governor, can change them. Depending on the rules peculiar to a given state’s 
legislative process, a small minority may be able to defeat even legislation with strong support.”).  
 204 See Weisbord, supra note 156, at 316 (discussing the need to remove incumbent managers of charities 
in some cases “to protect the public interest from continued neglect, mismanagement, and misuse of charitable 
assets”). 
 205 Cf. Kimhi, supra note 145. 
 206 In many cases, the state may also be a major creditor. 
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designed to help a distressed public IHE resolve its financial problems.207 Each 
option offers a different procedure for resolving a public IHE’s financial distress 
“and each places the burden of the crisis on a different entity.”208  
If state officials believe that it is appropriate to force creditors to bear the 
cost of their non-performing loans, theoretically, they have two choices. In 
theory, they could allow the public IHE to discharge their obligations to creditors 
in bankruptcy. Alternatively, they could deny the public IHE access to 
bankruptcy and leave creditors with their “exceedingly weak remedies under 
state law.”209 At the moment, however, the former solution is largely illusory.210 
Under current law, bankruptcy is effectively a death sentence for IHEs because 
they lose access to Title IV student loan and grant programs (i.e. Stafford Loans, 
Grad Plus, Pell, etc.) if they enter bankruptcy.211  
Unfortunately, without a bankruptcy option, creditors are likely to hound 
public IHEs in an attempt to collect on their debts. One example is the City of 
Harrisburg, PA. In 2003, Harrisburg borrowed “$125 million to rebuild and 
expand the city’s enormous trash incinerator.”212 For various reasons, the project 
was not economically successful, and the city’s incinerator-related obligations 
swelled to almost $300 million,213 with incinerator-related payments due that 
sometimes exceeded the city’s annual budget.214 But after Pennsylvania blocked 
the city from filing bankruptcy and made clear that it would not bail the city out 
 
 207 See, e.g., Kimhi, supra note 145, at 654 (suggested that there are three options for resolving the 
financial distress of cities: “creditors’ remedies, chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code, and state financial boards.”); 
Kordana, supra note 145, at 1046 (1997) (focusing only on whether creditors or city residents should bear the 
risk of municipal insolvency, either in chapter 9 or through state law remedies). 
 208 Kimhi, supra note 145, at 636. 
 209 Buccola, Limits, supra note 145 (“Creditors have exceedingly weak remedies under state law. They 
cannot foreclose on municipal property in any meaningful sense, and consequently bankruptcy’s utility, if it has 
any, must lie in its capacity to do something other than coordinate collection efforts.”). 
 210 Where the state fails to prevent municipal financial distress ex ante and cannot resolve it ex post, 
municipal bankruptcy should be an option. See Gillette & Skeel, supra note 145, at 1155 (Where the state fails 
to intervene to redress structural difficulties that cause fiscal distress “because of its own political constraints, 
rather than as a consequence of a deliberate decision . . . we find fewer reasons to preclude bankruptcy courts 
from filling the gap.”). 
 211 See Bruckner, DNRs, supra note 8, at 228 (“Essentially, Congress has imposed an involuntary ‘do not 
resuscitate’ order on IHEs, condemning some socially valuable enterprises to an unnecessary death.”); see also 
Bruckner, Bankrupting, supra note 8, at 698 (calling bankruptcy “an effective death sentence” for most IHEs); 
Bruckner, Terminating Tenure, supra note 13, at 262; Norberg, supra note 9. 
 212 Michael Cooper, An Incinerator Becomes Harrisburg’s Money Pit, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/21/us/21harrisburg.html?_r=0. 
 213 Id. (“The incinerator, which the city had hoped to turn into a moneymaker, is instead $288 million in 
debt.”). 
 214 Id. (“[T]he $68 million in incinerator-related payments due this year [2010]—more than it spends in 
its annual budget.”). 
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using state funds, creditors continued to seek repayment. City residents were 
forced to find alternative ways to repay their creditors by, for example, 
monetizing certain city assets.215 
In addition, by denying IHEs access to bankruptcy, IHEs will not be able to 
receive the fresh start they could otherwise accomplish by discharging their un-
repayable debts, and rejecting executory contracts, including some collectively-
bargained agreements.216 To be clear, though, even if IHEs had access to 
bankruptcy, they might not be able to regain their economic footing. Bankruptcy 
cannot, for example, force students to attend a college if the “product” it offers 
is no longer a desirable one.217 And many higher education leaders may think 
that bankruptcy is a non-starter because they fear students would not attend a 
bankrupt institution. 
By contrast, if state officials believe that creditors should not bear the risk of 
improvident lending to public IHEs, they should invest greater resources in 
ensuring that public IHEs make better financial decisions. They might look to 
borrow from structures devised in North Carolina or Ohio to aid municipal 
borrowing. For example, North Carolina has something called the Local 
Government Commission (LGC).218 The LGC is “legally responsible for the 
approval of nearly all local-government debt” in North Carolina.219 Before it will 
approve a debt issuance, the LGC first meets with the local government that 
seeks to issue the debt to discuss the purpose and amount of the debt and the 
likelihood that the local government will be able to fulfill its obligations to 
bondholders.220 The LGC can also intervene to either direct local officials to act 
 
 215 Buccola, Legislation, supra note 73, at 1324 (“The legislature had vetoed Harrisburg’s use of 
bankruptcy. Harrisburg eventually entered state receivership, the net economic effect being—in the eyes of 
some, at least—to spare creditors at the expense of residents.”); see also Cooper, supra note 212 (discussing the 
possible sale or lease of city property—garages—that could repay some of the incinerator-related debt after the 
state “made it clear that it [was] unlikely to bail out its capital . . . .”). 
 216 See Buccola, Limits, supra note 145 (“The economic function of bankruptcy, in general, is to cure 
allocative distortions that follow from high levels of debt . . . . By cleaning up a debtor’s balance sheet, it 
encourages people to make investment decisions in accord with the underlying value of available resources.”); 
Bruckner, Terminating Tenure, supra note 13 (discussing possible limitations on terminating tenured faculty at 
public IHEs). 
 217 See Bruckner, DNRs, supra note 8, at 247–48 (discussing Sweet Briar College’s “difficulty of 
recruiting applicants to a rural women’s liberal arts college” and noting that bankruptcy could not help) (citing 
Scott Jaschik, Sweet Briar Survives, INSIDE HIGHER ED (June 22, 2015), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/ 
2015/06/22/deal-will-save-sweet-briar-college); cf. Buccola, Limits, supra note 147. 
 218 See Omer Kimhi, A Tale of Four Cities—Models of State Intervention in Distressed Localities Fiscal 
Affairs, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 881, 887 (2012); Parker, supra note 169, at 115 (providing an extensive discussion 
of North Carolina’s Local Government Commission). 
 219 Parker, supra note 169, at 145. 
 220 Id. at 146–47 (listing the information the LGC considers and the factors upon which the LGC decides 
BRUCKNER_7.15.20 7/15/2020 2:05 PM 
2020] FINANCIAL DISTRESS IN MUNICIPAL ENTITIES 381 
or to displace existing officials and act in their stead.221 As one author wrote, 
“[l]aying out the ground rules for all local governments and imposing fiscal 
responsibility for their actions—as opposed to the vague notion that the state 
will bail the locality out if distress is great enough—creates an environment 
where political leaders take a higher level of responsibility for their financial 
decision-making.”222  
Similarly, Ohio has designed an “‘early warning system[]’ to monitor and 
alert the state to financially troubled local governments,” which can prompt the 
state government to intervene “before a crisis like those in Orange County, 
Harrisburg, or Detroit can emerge.”223 The Ohio State Auditor’s Office 
encourages local governments to maintain certain financial performance ratios 
and collects data on whether local governments maintain these ratios.224 
Something similar to either the North Carolina or Ohio models could be 
developed and applied to public IHEs to help ensure that they make better 
financial decisions.225  
CONCLUSION 
Like all IHEs, public IHEs labor under the current prohibition on bankrupt 
IHEs disbursing Title IV student aid. But even if the HEA were amended to 
remove this prohibition,226 public IHEs in more than a score of states would very 
likely remain cut off from bankruptcy entirely. This conclusion emerges from a 
first-of-its-kind parsing of the existing case law on the eligibility of various 
entities for either chapter 9 or 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.  
Access to bankruptcy reorganization could make a difference for some 
public IHEs. It cannot fix all the problems that ail IHEs, but it could help them 
reduce expenses by, for example, allowing them to renegotiate collective 
 
whether to approve the debt). 
 221 By contrast, without the LGC, normally the state governor must act to remove blameworthy officers 
and directors. But governors do not appear to do so. See id. at 152 (“The LGC may also remove individuals from 
office. Additionally, if the local unit is not cooperative, the LGC may impound the entity’s financial records and 
assume control of its financial affairs.”).  
 222 Id. at 153. 
 223 Id. at 113–14. 
 224 Id. at 113–14, n.22 (citing PUB. FIN. MGMT., STATE PROGRAMS FOR MUN. FIN. RECOVERY: AN 
OVERVIEW 1 (2011), https://www.pfm.com/uploadedFiles/Content/Knowledge_Center/Whitepapers,_Articles, 
_Commentary/Whitepapers/State%20Programs%20for%20Municipal%20Financial%20 Recovery.pdf). 
 225 But see Gillette & Skeel, supra note 145, at 1235–36 (suggesting that states may not act due to 
legislative inertia).  
 226 Or § 525 were amended to effectively overrule In re Betty Owen Schools, Inc., 195 B.R. 23 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1996).  
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bargaining agreements, terminating unnecessary executory contracts or 
unexpired leases, and right-sizing faculty and staff levels. Bankruptcy can 
achieve these goals while placing the burden of improvident lending to public 
IHEs on creditors, which state officials may legitimately prefer. 
This Article furthers our understanding of the limits of federal bankruptcy 
law. Bankruptcy reorganization offers a set of tools for addressing financial 
distress but is not available to certain entities. Some of these restrictions are 
explicitly set forth in the Bankruptcy Code. But others, such as the restriction on 
bankruptcy reorganization’s use for IHEs, have been less well-known. 
Hopefully this Article, along with the others I have written on related topics, 
helps to reveal the holes in the fabric of our bankruptcy system. 
This Article also builds on the municipal bankruptcy literature by applying 
that literature in a new setting: public IHEs. This Article concludes that there is 
no one group that plays the role of residual claimant of public IHEs, or that 
controls decision-making at public IHEs. This finding highlights that the 
municipal bankruptcy literature’s animating analogy—that shareholders of 
corporations can be analogized to residents of cities—lacks bite in the context 
of certain special purpose municipal entities such as public IHEs. Thus, the risk 
of improvident higher education borrowing must instead be placed on either the 
state or on creditors. The decision of how to resolve the financial distress of 
public IHEs is likely to come down to a political calculation about whether 
public IHEs should be authorized to reorganize in bankruptcy (harming 
creditors) or if the state should repay the debts of defaulting public IHEs. 
